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24 September 1980

# Sub-Saharan Africa Report

FOUO No. 690



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## SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA REPORT

FOUO No. 690

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INTER-AFRICAN AFFAIRS

MMM OFFICIAL INTERVIEW ON 'CRISIS'

Paris AFRIQUE-ASIE in French 4 Aug 80 p 42

[Interview with Mauritian Militant Movement Assistant General Secretary Jean-Claude de l'Estrac in Paris by Herve-Masson]

[Text] Jean-Claude de l'Estrac is a member of the Mauritian Parliament and of the Mauritian Militant Movement (MMM) progressive opposition. As assistant general secretary in charge of the party's foreign relations, he is the "minister of foreign affairs" of the MMM shadow cabinet. Passing through Paris on the way back from a preparatory conference of the International Committee for Solidarity with the Arab People and Palestine Their Central Cause, held in Beirut, he granted us an interview.

[Question] The "crisis" on Mauritius is often mentioned and then nothing happens. What do you think or what do you have to say about the political situation in general on Mauritius?

[Answer] I will not dwell on this subject, as you have often talked about it in AFRIQUE-ASIE. I will say only that in the context of that Mauritian pseudoparliamentary democracy, the government has been in the minority in the Assembly several times; let the scandals continue, ever greater.

Besides the jewel theft which you wrote about, there is a constant challenging of democratic institutions by the government in office. Not only does the press talk about it, but even the public no longer understands. In a really democratic country, the government of Sir Seewoosagur Ramgoolam would have been forced to resign and we would be in the middle of an election campaign. I will add that all of that is taking place in an extremely serious economic crisis. But the coalition government is hanging on ...

[Question] What is the ratio of power between the various parties?

[Answer] The figures speak for themselves. During the recent meetings on 1 May, the MMM which I represent assembled more than 10,000 militants (and we believe that we could have done better), while the PSM (Mauritian Socialist Party, a splinter group of the ruling Labor Party) assembled 2,000 to 3,000 people and the Labor Party

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people and the Labor Party, despite an intense propaganda campaign, assembled less than 1,000. These figures say more than any commentary.

[Question] There is talk of a possible alliance between the MMM and PSM; is that possible?

[Answer] It is too early to tell, but we note a certain alinement of the PSM with our positions. That makes it possible to hope. I believe that Boo Boodhoo [PSM leader] has understood the direction in which the winds of history are blowing.

[Question] I would like to talk to you about the political-military situation in the Indian Ocean. Some time ago, the general secretary of the ruling Labor Party and the chairman of that same party seemed willing to adopt positions close to those of the MMM concerning Diego Garcia, South Africa and even recognition of the POLISARIO as the sole representative of an independent Arab republic in the western Sahara. What is the situation today?

[Answer] The Mauritian Government's foreign policy is characterized by its contradictions. Whereas certain Labor Party leaders strongly advocate a "progressive" policy, the government's official line is often the opposite. Official delegations visit South Africa and there is talk at the present time of establishing diplomatic relations with that country. The amount of South African imports in Mauritius amounted to more than 400 million rupees in 1979; it was only 60 million in 1968 at the time of independence.

With regard to the OAU, the least that can be said is that Mauritius is aligned with moderate countries. We hide our faces in public when it comes to the western Sahara or the right of the Palestinians to a homeland. Our minister of foreign affairs, Sir Harold Walter, publicly praises President Sadat. That does not prevent the government from sending a mission to Libya! No one takes us seriously any longer.

I am returning from an Arab-African conference in Beirut, where the Mauritian Labor Party's delegate, Mohamed Tally, enthusiastically supported the most progressive positions in favor of the Palestinian people. But on Mauritius itself, the party to which he belongs (and which delegated him!) supports the Camp David accords, expands its embassy in Cairo and congratulates Sadat on his cowardly stand! That is the foreign policy of the Laborites. It is not serious.

[Question] We are familiar with the MMM's major principles and choices regarding foreign policy. What would you do following a new crisis which would end with your party attaining power?

[Answer] In our opinion, the primary issue is the security and independence of countries bordering the Indian Ocean. From that standpoint, we would have to take action immediately for dismantling the American base on Diego Garcia, which is Mauritian territory, let's not forget. The fight will not be easy, but we can stand on the precedents set by the Seychelles, to which the British

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were forced to return three of the islands forming the BIOT (British Indian Ocean Territory) with Diego Garcia. We think that we can rely on the support of pacifist nations in the area to achieve this result. India also does not look favorably on that powerful American base in the heart of the Indian Ocean. Nor does Madagascar, Tanzania or the Seychelles.

Nor must we neglect the human problem posed by the uprooting of the "islanders" of Diego Garcia, who in a way are the "Palestinians of the Indian Ocean."

More generally, a MMM government would do everything, with the help of Madagascar, the Seychelles and other bordering countries, to make our ocean a region of peace. We do not want foreign bases in that area. From any bloc. We think that we will be able to maintain good relations with all great powers without, however, consenting to take the risk of giving up our independence.

With regard to our position within the OAU (and the United Nations), it is obvious that our policy could only reinforce that of progressive countries struggling against all forms of colonialism and neocolonialism. With regard to our future relations with South Africa, it is evident that we will make every effort to keep our distance. We believe that with the help of certain nonaligned countries, we will manage to free ourselves from Pretoria's economic hold rather quickly. That raises a serious question concerning our supply of foodstuffs and some of our exports, but I want to vigorously stress that the MMM is firmly against the system of apartheid.

Our job will not be easy, but we have already acquired the means to carry it out, loyal to the policy which we established more than 10 years ago.

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INTER-AFRICAN AFFAIRS

PDS BACKED BY AFRICAN PARTIES

Paris AFRIQUE-ASIE in French 4-17 Aug 80 p 35

[Text] The audience the PDS [Senegalese Democratic Party] has won in Africa was emphasized by the presence at the May congress of a delegation representing the MPLA in Angola and the FRELIMO in Mozambique, as well as representatives of the ANC, as well as the numerous messages received, including one from the Algerian FLN.

The welcome given the MPLA delegation, both at the sessions and in the course of visits to various places in the country, confirmed, if the need remained, that the attitude of Leopold Sedar Senghor's government toward Angola was condemned by the Senegalese people. The PDS also made itself well and truly the interpreter for the people when it approved a special motion demanding that the government in Dakar immediately normalize its relations with the Angolan nation, headed by President Jose Eduardo dos Santos. (Senegal is known to be the only one of the independent African nations which has not recognized Angola and which continues to support the puppet UNITA movement headed by Jonas Savimbi, which is playing into the hands of Pretoria and Washington.)

The third congress provided an opportunity for the PDS, moreover, to reassert its support of the true liberation movement in Africa. It is known that this is not a temporary or opportunistic attitude, as the detractors of the PDS would have it believed, but a position of permanent principle which dates back a long time. For example, the PDS was the second African party, following the FLN, to recognize the Saharan Arab Republic, and it is also known that Mr Wade's links with the MPLA leaders go back to the early 1960s.

The principle of "unconditional solidarity with national liberation movements" is incorporated moreover in the bylaws of the PDS, which is in addition a convinced and active advocate of African unity and independence. This position can be summarized in the following principle, which is also included in the party platform, and was abundantly developed at the May congress by Mr Wade: "Priority for horizontal African relations, over vertical relations with the developed countries."

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The strengthening of the executive secretariat of the party "will moreover allow the development and expansion of the already numerous links the PDS has established with brotherly parties which, basically, share the same ideas, on the subject of African unity in particular," stressed Farah Ndiaye, deputy national secretary general, in charge of economic and financial affairs on the national level and of the organization of foreign relations. It will involve, for example, the establishment of closer links with the PAIGC, whose relations are currently monopolized by the government in Dakar. It will also be necessary, among other things, to deepen relations on the highest level with the ANC and the SWAPO. "It is true that the Senghor government aids the SWAPO, but the support of the PDS is based on an ideological principle. It goes without saying that in the event that the liberation movement of the Namibian people finds itself in conflict with the privileged partners of the Senegalese government, it will not be lacking the support of the PDS."

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INTER-AFRICAN AFFAIRS

COMMENTARIES ON POOR SHOWING OF AFRICANS IN OLYMPICS

Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 13-20 Aug 80 pp 90-94

[Article by Abdelaziz Dahmani: "The Africans' Fiasco"]

[Text] The curtain has fallen on the 22d Olympic Games in Moscow after a closing ceremony on the evening of 3 August, a ceremony which, as if in reply to the opening, constituted a new pinnacle of gymnastics with its enormous panorama of color, dance and song.

It is an art of which the Soviets are past masters and at the close of a movement executed by over 2,000 young people, the mascot Mishka was seen to shed a few tears.

Malaise

The exceptional beauty of the finale still did not relieve the atmosphere in which the Games were plunged well before they opening, ever since President Carter called for a boycott, to be precise.

Many of the countries present in Moscow refused to participate in the closing ceremony parade, and in his farewell message, the president of the International Olympic Committee issued a poignant appeal: "I urge athletes all over the world to join together in peace before there is a holocaust!" He pleaded to save the next Games scheduled to be held in Los Angeles in 1984. The American Government nevertheless stood firm, requiring, through a diplomatic note, that its flag not be present or its national anthem played at the closing ceremony as is traditional with the passing of the Olympic torch.

Once night had fallen on the enormous bowl of Lenin Stadium, it was time to sort out contradictory feelings and conclusions. In the final analysis, the Moscow Games were neither too bleak nor too rosy, with qualities and flaws specific to the USSR, its physical presence, the Russian soul.

Every possible was done, without sparing human or material means and by mobilizing the best civilian and military brains, to see that the Games would be in the image of the USSR and its industrial power. But the armor

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has its chinks, weak points and ponderousness, even if compensated for by the very engaging Slavic manner.

But despite the means brought into play and the performances recorded, something indefinable was still missing from these grandiose Games, like a special holiday dish prepared with taste and art but lacking salt. Whence the feeling of vague malaise, with the invisible political background formed by the occupation of Afghanistan or human rights.

#### Records

To speak about either of these subjects in Moscow was incongruous; that meant introducing politics into sports.... Even PRAVDA refrained from giving the overall ranking based on the number of medals won -- even if highly advantageous for the Soviets -- so as to scrupulously respect the Olympic rule that "the Games pit individuals, not nations, against one another."

But let there be no mistake about it. As soon as the Games were over, the Soviet Union set its powerful propaganda machine into motion, the multiple voices of Radio Moscow, its whole apparatus of newspapers, magazines and information agencies, without counting its embassies, in order to make the most of a festival that cost the trifling sum -- athletic facilities included -- of over 3 billion rubles (\$4.5 billion).

Actually, it was rather the athletes who saved the Games by the quality of a great number of performances. There were no less than 36 world records and 76 new Olympic records set. An attendance record was set also: some 4.8 million spectators for all the games combined, compared with 3.5 million in Montreal in 1976. In order to accomplish this, the Soviets were offered tickets reserved by some 250,000 tourists who cancelled their trips.

One enigma has not yet been resolved: No case of doping was discovered although the level of performances has steadily climbed. As a result, it has been claimed that the Moscow Games were "the cleanest" of the post-World War II period. Nevertheless, a number of specialists believe that laboratories which prepare for certain national selections have perhaps managed to discover a new generation of products not yet detectable by current control methods.

Whatever the case, the Games reached very high levels in several instances. Track, the main Olympic sport, saw prestigious records fall. Wessing of East Germany cleared 2.36 meters in the high jump, Kozakiewicz of Poland recorded a 5.78 in the pole vault and Soviet Sedykh threw the hammer 81.80 meters. The women's 400-meter relay team achieved a mark of 41.60 and Soviet Olizarenko ran the 800 meters in 1.53:5.

Other exceptional performances, other near records spurred on the track events. One had to see the two English fellow countrymen, enemies Ovett

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and Coe carry off the 1,500- and the 800-meters or Ethiopian Yifter performing a double feat in the 5,000- and 10,000 meters. The swimming events also brought eight new world records, with the standouts being Barbara Krause (GDR) and Soviet Salnikov. But here, the American boycott totally distorted results and a number of American women, competing at the same time as the Games, achieved performances often better than those in Moscow.

Medals

There were also the traditional number of records set in weight lifting, events that marked the twilight of the legendary Alekseyev, "the world's strongest man," and the arrival of another Soviet super heavyweight, Sultan Rakhmanov, who lifted 440 kilograms in the clean and jerk.

Vasily Alekseyev was not the only "god of the stadiums" to experience an eclipse. There was also the legendary Cuban athlete Juantorena, the winner of the 400 meters and the 800 meters at Montreal, Lassen Viren, who yielded the 5,000 and the 10,000 to Ethiopian Yifter, and many others. Swezinska of Poland was participating in her fifth consecutive Olympics Games.

Out of the 203 gold medals presented, the USSR won a total of 80 (40 percent) and of all medals awarded, 197. It is an uneven record, far exceeding the 70 gold medals won by the United States in the St. Louis Games in 1904. The GDA, with 17 million inhabitants, alone won 47 gold medals (125 medals total), leaving 36 for the six other socialist countries, including Cuba (8), 36 for all liberal countries such as Italy (8), France (6), Great Britain (5), Sweden (3), and so on. Six medals went to the rest of the world: Brazil (2), Ethiopia (2), India (1) and Zimbabwe (1).

The athletes of 25 countries mounted the winner's stand to receive gold medals and 11 others won silver or bronze medals.

While there was no lack of athletic feats, the Games also witnessed the emergence of a certain chauvinism and flagrant irregularities in certain disciplines, leaving doubts about the regularity of some track events and great suspicions about gymnastics and boxing.

These few shadows in no way altered the satisfaction and conviction that the "festival was perfect" held by certain sports officials from the USSR, as in the case of Vladimir Popov. Each day, he held a press conference before 400 to 500 newsmen who were not always accommodating. The embarrassing questions never altered his humor or imperturbability. It was the newsmen who finally tired of shooting their little darts at the great Soviet bear.

Africa's Difficulties

The Africans had few sources of satisfaction. Naturally, there was the exceptional Miruts Yifter, who won the 5,000 and 10,000 meters. There were also Tanzanians Filbert Bayi and Suleiman Nyambei, two silver medal



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winners in the 3,000-meter steeplechase and the 5,000. Finally, there were Yifter's two lieutenants: Mohamed Kedir and Eshetu Tura, bronze medal winners in the 10,000 and the 3,000-meter steeplechase. Behind this small group was no one!

In boxing, another African specialty, only Ugandan John Mugabi (67 kilograms) managed to break into the 44 candidates for medals. In order to do so, he had to knock out Congolese Koffi and Malagasy Rasamimanana, before eliminating Szczerba of Poland by points. Only Cuban Andres Aldama beat him and gained a chance for the gold medal. But here again, one swallow does not make a summer.

Aside from these few examples of success, mediocrity sometimes bordered on the ridiculous. Despite the absence of some 20 countries, African participation was plethoric. One athlete and one boxer out of four were African, although the representation was more modest among women and in the other individual sports.

It would be tedious, not to say depressing, to recall all the poor performances. Our Africans were practically always the last in their events, occasionally consoling themselves with beating a Laotian or a Vietnamese also competing in the Games for the first time. Very often, the marks of our athletes were worse than those of some women over the same distances and far below those that made a number of our representatives famous in the 1968 or 1972 Games.

From Montreal to Moscow

One must also recall the 1976 boycott, the boycott of the Montreal Games. That was when the nucleus of the African athletes were morally "assassinated" by a few bad advisers. Everyone now admits that it was a fatal error and that there were other more effective ways to gain acceptance of our rights, especially since the reason for the 1976 boycott was close to ridiculous when the attempt was to punish New Zealand for sports competitions with South Africa. Actually, from that time on, Africa placed itself in a position of inferiority and out of the competition.

Nevertheless, the Montreal boycott does not explain everything. One has to emphasize the poor sports policies of our countries, which have often sought the sensational, immediate success, sacrificing in-depth work, sometimes because of a lack of means but also of conviction. We have reached the point where one only counts the exceptional performers such as the diabolical Yifter or Henri Rono, the notable absentee from the Games. Behind them, total desolation.

In Moscow, the Africans seemed to have made an appearance merely for the sake of folklore, adornment, an exotic note. There was sometime factitious, unreal about the massive but incredibly ineffective and depressing representation. Even the public, moved to hilarity by some of the performances, stopped laughing and whistling.

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At least, it will be said, our leaders were probably moved and learned their lesson, but that is far from the truth. They continue to revel in their words, presenting themselves as the continent of hope, of the future, of exceptional champions. But in truth, their main concern is but to save their titles, their privileges, their trips. In Moscow, most of the so-called sports officials seemed to care only about corridor intrigues, the late nights spent in hotel rooms, the petty plots aimed at such and such a candidate for such and such a post.

The famous meeting that was to lead to a union of African national Olympic committees turned into a farce.

The candidate for the chairmanship of the committee, Ivorin Ambassador Louis Guirandou N'Diaye, elected vice president of the IOC a few days earlier, labeled the machinations directed at the new phantom union as "vile." Some saw it as a threat to the very existence of the CSSA (Higher Sports Council in Africa), which was totally undone by the boycott of certain African countries.

Consequently, some countries have not been to the Olympic Games for 8 years, thereby losing all contact with reality as far as progress in world sports is concerned. One example: A single African record was beaten, in track, by Ugandan Justin Arop in the javelin, this in comparison with 36 world records beaten. In team sports, it was a rout, nothing but defeats by pitiful scores.

#### Dupes

It is undoubtedly pretentious to hope for more medals in the future, considering the gaps that have emerged in a great number of sports. It is especially disturbing to find practically no Africans in most finals and semi-finals. Before long, there will be none.

The general feeling is that the Africans let themselves be duped. Their way and stay were paid for solely in order to add numbers. Even the Soviets, aside from the reassuring speeches of friendship and brotherhood, were bothered by the poor performances of their African friends and consequently plan to end the contracts of most of the 77 trainers they provided for the African nations to help them prepare for the Games.

Some leaders are not unhappy to see an end to this experiment with the Soviet trainers. They want to resume their dear customs of having African athletes sent to national sports institutes in France or West Europe, where shopping and *la dolce vita* are much better!

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INTER-AFRICAN AFFAIRS

GABON-EQUATORIAL GUINEA COOPERATION AGREEMENTS SIGNED

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 15 Aug 80 pp 2035-2036

[Report: "Big Mixed Commission. Cooperation Agreements Signed With Gabon"]

[Text] Several cooperation agreements were signed in Malabo following the meeting of the big Gabon-Equatorial Guinea Mixed Commission, which was held on 28 to 30 July.

According to the commercial agreement the two parties shall grant import and export facilities to their economic units. They have decided that goods coming from or going to either country shall be issued a certificate of origin. Furthermore, the agreement calls for the two parties to facilitate the organization of fairs and expositions in both countries. Payments shall be made in currencies freely convertible in both countries.

On this occasion the Gabonese delegation offered to its partner Gabonese goods which could be marketed in Equatorial Guinea, such as kerosene for lamps, tobaccos, cigarettes, carbonated soft drinks, beer, print fabrics, bottled gas, Okoume and ozigo wood, plywood, dressed and undressed timber, batteries, eggs, and yogurt. Equatorial Guinea will submit its list of goods through diplomatic channels.

The air agreement stipulates that aircraft of either country may fly over the territory of the other for purposes of loading and unloading passengers or for other commercial reasons. Airplanes of the Gabonese company in charge of the implementation of this agreement could fly along the Libreville-Bata-Malabo route while Equatorial Guinea airplanes may fly the Malabo-Ovem-Libreville route.

A cultural agreement, whose draft had been submitted to Equatorial Guinea in November 1979, was signed as well. According to the agreement Gabon and Equatorial Guinea shall undertake to promote school, university, scientific, technical, literary, artistic, and sports cooperation. Teachers, technicians, and cultural and artistic goods will be exchanged.

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The draft agreement on the merchant marine, submitted to Equitorial Guinea by the Gabonese delegation will be considered by a mixed commission.

Equitorial Guinea also requested a revision of the petroleum agreement which Equitorial Guinea and Gabon had signed on 13 November 1979; stipulating that the agreement had not been negotiated by its experts, it asked for a reexamination. Let us recall that the agreement granted the Petrogab Company exclusive exploitation and exploration rights in the northern zone of Equitorial Guinea. It also called for the creation of a company and for supplying the technical and financial means for the implementation of this objective.

On the draft postal agreement, Gabon requested that the project be extended to telecommunications, taking into consideration the indivisible nature of these two sectors. Even though the question was referred to a mixed commission, Equitorial Guinea has already suggested the establishment of telegraph communications between the two countries. In turn, Gabon is planning the building of a 400-line Telex center.

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INTER-AFRICAN AFFAIRS

DIFFICULT CHOICE OF NATIONAL LANGUAGE DISCUSSED

Paris AFRIQUE-ASIE in French 4 Aug 80 pp 55-56

[Article by Jean Copans]

[Text] No black African nation has established a systematic policy for protecting national languages. Besides the political problem of selecting the national language or languages to be promoted, all social, political, economic and cultural activities are also involved. This is why pilot projects, experiments and test operations abound. For it always comes down to the basic question: using vernacular languages, native languages, yes of course, but for what purpose?

We might first begin at the beginning: making spoken languages official by means of dictionaries, lexicons and various types of descriptive grammars. We might then agree on a system of writing which would subsequently make it possible to begin a process of education (in the case of children) and eliminating illiteracy (in the case of adults). Education means instruction at all possible levels and grades, from elementary school to vocational training, from popularization of technology to university research and artistic creation.

Some examples of these various practices will enable us to judge the mass benefit of a strategy for using African national languages.

Standardization of spelling (and thus of writing) is very important and must be definitive. It is actually impossible to consider changing it every time that some progress is made in understanding the language. Moreover, as M. Houis and R. Bole Richard point out: "It is important for a dialog to be established between nations at the regional level so that the same systems of notation can be adopted for languages common to several nations." The transition to writing implies that the problem of rhythm, intonation, punctuation, etc., has been resolved.

Willingness of Villagers

A recent AGECCOOP (Cultural and Technical Cooperation Agency) publication examines policies for eliminating illiteracy and is very informative. Let us

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take the case of Benin. Illiteracy is being eliminated through "stimulating topics which have been incorporated into the procedure of the various ministerial departments with an educational program for the masses," like rural development, health care, education ... The method "is an adaptation of the one used by the Brazilian Paulo Freire. It is based on conversation between the person teaching reading and writing and the student, tending to create an exchange of ideas between the two. It starts out by analyzing an actual dehumanizing aspect of society, denounces that aspect and hails its transformation in the name of freeing mankind from the bonds of oppression and exploitation. It then takes up the study of the alphabet with a slogan formulated during the conversation between the teacher and students according to a mixed method."\*

Such a strategy thus implies a system of transcribing the language, teaching material and the willingness of villagers to have a literacy club and to share its expenses. Obviously, that also implies the development of publications (newspapers, brochures, books) so that literacy will remain established.

Postliteracy operations in Tanzania, "Syllabaries in Rural Libraries," have been set up. They are intended to stimulate and encourage those who have learned to read and write to use their knowledge to read for pleasure and to learn what they need to know to change their living conditions. In Mali and Togo, a rural press is developing in which everyday, personal, community, agricultural problems, etc., are discussed. Literacy thus leads to actual continuous education in the native language. An experiment conducted in Mali has even led its coordinator, Guy Belloncle, to conclude that actual scientific instruction can be provided in an African language, in this case Bambara.

From his experiment, Belloncle has derived three linguistic principles:  
1. Before coining neologisms, a systematic inventory of the existing vocabulary must be taken. 2. Neologisms must be coined in accordance with the "logic" and "spirit" of the language. 3. Certain borrowed words must be accepted, transcribing them according to the phonological rules of the language.\*\*

The author adds that experts should never suggest new neologisms before asking the people to suggest their own. A systematic development of the rural newspaper KIBARU in Bambara has made it possible to compile 700 neologisms!

#### Linking School and Society

In this case, the fact of starting with the entire community's current concerns and traditional knowledge gives the linguistic instrument both a theoretical (understanding the world in which we live) and practical (using this instrument to acquire and use new knowledge) fertility and effectiveness. By linking the

\*Re Paulo Freire, cf. AFRIQUE-ASIE No. 164, pp. 44-45.

\*\*Phonology is a branch of linguistics concerned with the way in which sounds work in a given language.

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school and society in such a close way, education is restored to its full importance. It is no longer just a shortcut to Western culture and deruralization for agricultural society.

Despite the importance of this literacy process, whether for raising awareness or even becoming functional, black Africa is still only at the stage of being willing to experiment in the best of cases. The most important efforts will be at the level of education, of setting up programs in national languages.

According to Houis and Bole Richard, three situations can be distinguished in which the African language assures access to written communication in an academic setting. In the first case, it assumes "all aspects of education as a vehicle; ... The European language is provided as a subject and only as such."

It is in Tanzania that the most developed policy is found: not only is Swahili used throughout elementary school, but it is in the process of becoming established at the secondary level. The second solution conceives of the African language as being used as a means of introducing writing--but ultimately all instruction is given in a European language. Finally, the last solution conceives of the African language as being used only for certain subjects, generally literary, while scientific disciplines continue to be taught in a European language. It is this kind of policy which is found in Guinea, Togo and Benin.

#### A Multitude of Solutions

However, it must be remembered that many local experiments are being conducted in all countries and that selecting the languages to be used as the scientific development for a written transcription are greatly retarding the general application of a more systematic policy. Senegal, Togo and Benin have made decisions in this regard, but teaching preparation for this transition has not really begun yet. Mali, Upper Volta and Niger have a functional literacy campaign, but these techniques are not yet being used in the schools. Whereas French is used solely at the elementary level, with one exception\* no African language is found at the secondary level.

When we consider the question of choosing languages, we note the variety of solutions used: Rwanda, Burundi and Somalia have an entirely monolingual educational curriculum; Guinea is using multilingual instruction (like Senegal, but use of the six national languages is still quite theoretical). In the case of Tanzania, its example deserves to be highlighted, for after an initial multilingual period at the elementary level, it "reviewed its options and decided to require the use of Swahili in all schools, considered a factor of national unity and because it extends over a vast regional area widely exceeding national borders" (Horris, Bole Richard).

\*Cf. articles in AFRIQUE-ASIE, Nos. 211 and 214.

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The general use of African languages for educating children, citizens and farmers does not yet seem imminent despite altogether positive national, regional and local examples. The scientific understanding of languages, the variety of social and cultural environments and the not only political, but also administrative and educational differences inherited from the old order of things preclude any utopian voluntarism.

But any consequent anti-imperialism and any policy based on the masses and for their benefit cannot avoid a return to the sources and practical knowledge of certain "Western" technologies. The best guarantee of such a cultural revolution, in the deep sense of the term, is through collective mastery of African languages, which alone can make self-confidence, social innovation and creation and political democracy possible. This is an ambitious undertaking, but the only one capable of signifying the radical decolonization of minds and institutions.

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INTER-AFRICAN AFFAIRS

POSSIBLE DEVALUATION OF CFA FRANC SEEN

Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 13-20 Aug 80 pp 26-27

[Article by Siradiou Diallo]

[Text] The exchange rate of the CFA franc, the currency of most French-speaking African countries, in relation to the French franc will not be changed. At least this is what the BCEAC (Central Bank of Central African States) claimed following its board of directors meeting in Brazzaville (Congo) on 26 July. For several months, however, rumors of a devaluation were spreading like wild-fire through certain ministries, government offices and money markets, although it is true that they did not spread panic in foreign, particularly French, financial circles.

Different Exchange Rates

According to a confidential letter published in Paris, the actual overvaluation of the CFA franc is hampering, if not blocking, the exports of some zone countries more and more. Thus despite official denials both in Paris and Africa, more and more serious consideration is being given to devaluating this famous ex-franc of the French coasts of Africa. In the opinion of some people, it would even have to be assigned different exchange rates (in relation to the French franc), depending on the country. Even today, whether issued by the BCEAO (Central Bank of West African States) or by the BCEAC, a CFA franc is worth 0.02 French francs in Dakar as well as in Libreville, Abidjan and Yaounde. But there could be a Gabonese franc, a Senegalese franc, a Cameroonian franc ... with each of these currencies having its own value and a different exchange rate with respect to the French franc.

"There is no advantage in devaluating the CFA franc," French economy minister Rene Monory told us, adding: "I am amazed to hear you mention such a possibility, since to my knowledge there has never been any question of it." Some African political leaders go even further. In their opinion such rumors, although not new, originate in British business circles. Already annoyed by the performance of their French competitors in French-speaking African markets, they are trying to break down the operating structures set up by the franc zone (see JEUNE AFRIQUE No. 988), structures through which the zone's

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African countries, which have privileged ties with France, enjoy a stable and guaranteed currency. Thanks to the operations account (a type of accounting system for African currencies, used by the French treasury), they point out, those countries are actually unaware of currency shortages, a bottleneck from which Third World countries generally suffer. According to Africans with whom we spoke, these "cleverly refined insinuations" from the City of London are not happenstance.

Breakdown

If these rumors are presently circulating, it is above all to torpedo the monetary integration policy which ECOWAS (Economic Community of West African States) members are striving to promote. Didn't the secretariat of that organization, which includes 16 countries, recently ask the International Monetary Fund to study the possibilities and implications of totally converting the currencies of the community's member nations among themselves? From this standpoint, "some people," it is said, are trying to destroy the basis of the already existing monetary structure: the institutions of the franc zone.

In circles close to the UMOA (West African Monetary Union), composed of six countries (Benin, Ivory Coast, Upper Volta, Niger, Togo and Senegal) and whose issuing institution is the BCEAO, they profess to be "frankly indignant" over such "speculation." The establishment of different exchange rates between member countries, they state with some irritation, would amount to "breaking down our unity" and especially the foundation on which it is based, our instrument of solidarity, the BCEAO.

Price Spiral

They add that establishing different exchange rates would result in a serious setback in comparison to what has been achieved in 20 years of independence. That would amount to destroying the work and effort accomplished toward economic integration of the countries.

Fixed exchange rates actually facilitate much of their trade. Sooner or later, different exchange rates would result in an obstacle or at least problems in economic relations between franc-zone countries, not to mention that devaluation would definitely affect French companies in Africa, such as SCOA (West African Trading Company) or CFAO (French Company of West Africa), which are among the leading import-export agents in Africa. More seriously, any devaluation of the CFA franc would make manufactured products more expensive. And not only manufactured goods, but all imported products purchased abroad, even foodstuffs, starting with rice, would automatically become more expensive. A larger number of CFA francs would thus be required to purchase them abroad.

But nothing guarantees that these spiraling prices of imported goods would mean an increase in exports. It is indeed uncertain that lowering the prices of their export products would mean an automatic increase in sales for those African countries.

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With so many uncertainties involved, what government would risk initiating a devaluation? Especially in this period of international crisis characterized by inflation and recession at the same time. In Africa more than anywhere else, wage earners are already having more and more problems keeping up with the repeated increases in the prices of staple commodities such as rice, manioc, sugar and cigarettes, not to mention electricity or gasoline.

It is therefore difficult to imagine that franc-zone governments would rush into the questionable adventure of devaluation. In any case, countries like Ghana and Zaire, which have monetary zones and have agreed to lower their exchange rates on the strong recommendation of the IMF (International Monetary Fund), are slow in doing so.

In truth, the rumors of a CFA franc devaluation coincide with the economic problems which some African member nations of the franc-zone are experiencing. If we consider the UMOA, for example, it is clear that the current difficult economic situation of a country such as Senegal (see JEUNE AFRIQUE No. 1022) would inevitably affect the cushion of strong currencies available to the six member countries through their exports. With its sales outside the franc zone (peanuts and phosphates in particular), Senegal used to provide about 20 percent of the union's foreign exchange kitty. But the shortage of rainfall from which the country has suffered for 3 consecutive years and the drop in phosphate prices have eroded its contributions.

And since bad luck never strikes in just one place, the Ivory Coast, which alone accounts for 60 percent of the UMOA's foreign exchange on the average, is experiencing some problems this year. It is true that this is a cyclical phenomenon, since it concerns the deliberate withholding of the country's stock of cacao, a product which provides 30 percent of the foreign exchange amassed annually by the Ivory Coast. Until recently this country had refused to sell its cacao because of the low bottom price set on the London market and the UMOA thus showed a considerable shortage in its total foreign exchange reserves.

#### Passing Phenomenon

Fortunately, thanks to the uranium boom, Niger is now making a valuable contribution to the recovery of the UMOA's foreign holdings curve. In Niamey, however, political leaders and high government officials appear both modest and cautious when mention is made of their country's current status within the community monetary institution. They say that this is not only a "passing" but also a "very fragile" phenomenon. The situation can change at any moment. And they mention the difficult years in which "we were able to obtain the staple commodities which we needed only through the solidarity of other zone members." President Seyni Kountche and his associates are hardly not making excuses for their present economic comfort. Besides, they are not entirely wrong.

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The Only Way

Senegal needs only good rainfall to regain its rank within the UMOA and the Ivory Coast's economy has not lost any of its dynamic character. Once it is sold, the cacao stock will be converted into significant foreign exchange holdings, even if their amount does not reach the level of previous years, not to mention the fact that thanks to its discoveries of petroleum, the Ivory Coast should not only continue to be the region's leading country, but should further increase its advantage over the others. In the next 3 to 5 years, this will provide it with the same assets as Cameroon and Gabon, central Africa's two driving forces.

Under these conditions, it is unlikely that the risk will be taken to consider changing a system which has demonstrated its strength and effectiveness. Especially during this period in which the currencies of most nonoil-producing countries of Africa, not to mention the Third World, deprived of support, are all more or less adrift. In any case, the operations account with the French treasury has never, from an overall standpoint, shown a negative balance in 21 years of existence. This result alone largely justifies the existence of this original structure whose operation enables the most underprivileged countries to benefit from the foreign exchange amassed by the most affluent. Thus much rather than considering the breakup of this zone of solidarity, wouldn't the Africans be better advised to draw inspiration from it to respond to the appeals made at the Lagos economic summit with a view to hastening Africa's regional integration, an essential basis for development?

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INTER-AFRICAN AFFAIRS

IMPLICATIONS OF FRENCH PLAN TO CONSTRUCT REFINERY FOR MAURITIUS EXAMINED

Paris AFRIQUE-ASIE in French 4 Aug 80 pp 40-41

[Article by Dorothee Durban]

[Text] Located some 200 kilometers from each other, the islands of Reunion and Mauritius both urgently need to be industrialized. This is a mystery to no one and the future of those two territories depends on it. There is severe unemployment, to varying degrees, but it exists on both islands. Both Reunion and Mauritius are faced with the problem of being supplied with products derived from petroleum, in that area known for being at the center of the black gold route. It is normal for both of them to be concerned about this and to look for the most rational ways of solving a vital problem for their future.

Independent Mauritius--regardless of what anyone may think about its government--hopes that it has found a solution by building a refinery in the Medine area (southwest of the capital, Port-Louis). Reunion, to which the French Government made identical promises about 10 years ago, will have to forget about its most ambitious--and most realistic--plans. But the scandal, for it is a scandal, is that the Mauritian refinery will be built with French capital and people on Reunion are wondering why it couldn't have been allocated to their pseudo-department of Paris. That is a weighty matter whose significance should not be underestimated.

At the very time when two whole days of conferences were being held in Rouen, devoted to studying investments in DOM [overseas departments]--which will go down in history only as empty speeches and vague tourist projects--Mauritian officials were concluding a F 700-million contract with a French Government corporation for constructing a petroleum refinery at Medine to produce butane, motor fuel and fuel oil, 40 percent of which will be consumed locally--and the remainder exported. The project is to be completed within the next 3 years. It will be amortized in 5 years and will provide the Mauritian Government, the owner of the installations, with sizable foreign exchange revenues. Reunion will be one of the group's main customers.

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Now it so happens that the new refinery's prime contractor is Equipetrole, a company managed by none other than Societe Generale. Eighty-four percent of the equipment will be supplied by French companies which are themselves being financed by French banks, by the French Petroleum Institute and by the French Institute for Industrial Development.

Why didn't French authorities give preference to Reunion? The question deserves to be asked and has many implications. Mr Jean de Quengo de Tonguedec, Equipetrole's general manager, explained this--partially--in a statement to QUOTIDIEN DE LA REUNION on 10 March. "Our business," that individual explained, "is exportation, international trade. We were established for that purpose, to bring foreign exchange into France. There was no question of our operating in Reunion, since it is a French department. When the Mauritian Government asked us to make a feasibility study for a refinery, we naturally accepted. We had no reason to refuse. We are being reproached for having held secret negotiations. It must be pointed out that such negotiations are always secret ... Moreover, Foreign Trade's departments were fully informed and it was their duty alone to notify the Secretariat of State for DOM-TOM [overseas territories] if they considered it necessary."

In other words, because Reunion is a French department and because it cannot be a provided of foreign exchange by definition, its own interests could not be considered. Money matters demand secrecy. But that isn't all.

When French Prime Minister Raymond Barre received Pierre Lagourgue, chairman of the Reunion General Council, in March, he told him: "Reassure the people of Reunion on my behalf; I have decided to handle this matter myself." Raymond Barre no doubt handled the matter, but the contract between Mauritius and Equipetrole had been signed since ... 27 February, and obviously nothing has since been done to change matters. In any case, according to an official source, it is too late. And if France doesn't build in Mauritius, it will be Japan or the United States (whose Diego Garcia base is probably already on the new refinery's list of customers).

In reality, not only financial interests are involved. Providing Reunion with a petroleum refinery would not only mean giving it a modern industrial base, in a certain way it would also mean reducing its dependence on metropolitan France. But Paris is jealously alert to see that nothing like that happens. Independence movements--in one form or another--are gaining strength in that part of the world and the best guarantee against their threat, for the guardian power, apparently lies in maintaining Reunion's status of a territory receiving "aid."

#### Opposition Without Borders

Reunion's militant forces for an autonomy which could, under certain circumstances, lead to independence are not the only ones to point out the absurdity of a policy resulting in the deliberate sacrifice of the island's future for immediate profits and selfish colonialist-type motives. The JOURNAL DE L'ILE DE LA REUNION, representing a part of native capitalist interests, makes no secret of their concern.

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"It must be pointed out that such an industry [petroleum]," the newspaper wrote on 3 March, "is considered, in the jargon of economists, a driving in industry or even a focus of development. For not only can light products (gasoline, kerosene) or heavy products (fuel oil, etc.) be made from petroleum, but plastics as well and an entire industry related to the refinery can be established.

"An economically profitable refinery (its profitability depends not only on the volume processed, but also on the process used) is not an isolated plant, it is actually a complete economic blueprint ... For the department of Reunion, one of the first effects of establishing a refinery on the sister island is the concern of professionals about the financing of the future port of Possession. Part of the revenue was based on the unloading of petroleum products by tankers larger than those which will perhaps operate between the two islands."

These practical considerations are inducing local leaders of the Reunion economy to draw conclusions verging on autonomism. It is as much a sign of the times as the demonstration of a realism in direct contradiction to official "departmentalism." Mr Serge Payet, general secretary of the Liaison Committee for Reunion Economic Interests (Reunion employers' association), who could not be considered an "independence" fanatic, wrote in the May bulletin of the island's chamber of commerce and industry, after denouncing the scuttled construction of a Reunion refinery: "We think that the solution lies in the establishment of a departmental agency /which can take action/ (underlined in the text) regarding the establishment of significant industries and provide for coverage of part or all of the authorized capital. The ultimate extent of action would be the establishment of the tool of production locally and a request to the foreign or metropolitan industrial group for its expertise, with both things taking place at the same time, of course."

Perhaps it is not an exaggeration to think that such considerations, as conservative as they may be, reflect, like reformist methods which we have observed elsewhere, the ambitions of a local middle class which the "metropolitan" stranglehold is finally alienating despite the advantages which it could have provided.

And yet that is only one of the thoughts suggested by this affair ... In this case, the subject is inexhaustible and, among other things, we must perhaps wonder WHO preferred Mauritius to Reunion and WHY. This can only be a world strategy ... The situation is even more complicated because the Mauritian Government, according to our information, seems to be encountering certain problems not foreign to private American companies, including Caltex, which controls important positions in Reunion.

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BRIEFS

ZAIRIAN-BURUNDIAN COOPERATION AGREEMENT--On the occasion of the visit to Kinshasa of President Bagaza of Burundi, for the ceremonies marking the 20th anniversary of Zaire's independence, several agreements were to be signed between the two countries, especially a general cooperation agreement. The head of the Burundian state stressed the importance of cooperation between Zaire and Burundi which, together with Rwanda, belong to the economic community of the Grands Lacs countries. According to President Bagaza, particular attention should be given to the mutual exchange of information, and to the diffusion of scientific, cultural and artistic works through the press and the cinema. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 11 Jul 80 p 1752] 9294

ADDIS ABABA-SALISBURY AIRLINE--Ethiopian Airways has announced on 8 July that it would provide weekly service between Addis Ababa and Salisbury starting next 5 August. Starting in September, this service will be biweekly. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 18 Jul 80 p 1809] 9294

REGIONAL UNIVERSITY COOPERATION--On 7-9 July, in Addis Ababa, representatives from various East African universities held a regional conference to give new impetus to their cooperation. Delegations from Botswana, Ethiopian, Kenyan, Basotho, Malawian, Tanzanian and Ugandan universities took part in the conference. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 18 Jul 80 p 1809] 9294



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COFFEE TRANSPORT PROBLEMS--The Tanzania Railway Corporation (TRC) has ordered from The Netherlands and General Electric the necessary spare parts for the reconditioning of the Umoja ferryboat on Lake Victoria. The ferryboat had broken down last February as a result of which Ugandan ferryboat coffee shipments to Mwanza had been interrupted. The TRC director general specified that the ship's motor had "given up the ghost" and that a new motor was needed. However, the type of motor required was not quickly available anywhere in the world. Finally, the necessary parts ordered from The Netherlands were to be delivered in September. The TRC has other ships plying Lake Victoria: the Ngombe, which hauls cattle, and the Ruvuma. Both have had a number of mechanical troubles as well, and, anyway, could not replace the Umoja in hauling Ugandan coffee. Let us recall that this coffee goes through Tanzania (across Lake Victoria to Mwanze then by rail to Tanga), in accordance with an agreement concluded between Uganda and Tanzania in May 1979. Since July 1979 15,600 tons of Ugandan coffee have been transported by this route and by air to Dar-es-Salaam. Despite these serious transport problems, the Ugandan Coffee Marketing Board wishes to go on exporting almost all of its coffee through Tanzania. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 15 Aug 80 p 2039] 5157

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BENIN

REPORT ON RECENT ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTS

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 15 Aug 80 pp 2030-31

[Report: "Recent Elements of Economic Development"]

[Text] One of the latest economic and monetary statistical bulletins issued by the Central Bank of West African States (BCEAO) dealt with Benin.

The main agricultural output of the 1978/79 harvest totaled 1,341 tons of shelled peanuts (- 1,375 tons compared with the previous harvest); 4,111 tons of cocoa beans (+ 2,738 tons); 18,740 tons of unginned cotton (+3,851 tons); 248 tons of karatas (-8,026 tons); 23,430 tons of palmetto (+11,632 tons) and 170 tons of tobacco (-40 tons). The crop's worth was 1 billion CFA for the cocoa beans, 1 billion for unginned cotton, and 0.8 billion CFA for the palmetto.

At the onset of the 1979-1980 harvest the purchase price paid the producer was raised from 135 to 160 CFA francs per kilogram for coffee (compared with 140 francs paid the previous season), from 33.5 to 35 for the palmetto and from 125 to 130 for tobacco.

In the 1979-1980 season the Benin Palm Oil Company and the National Fat Extraction Company respectively engaged in the extraction of palm and palmetto oil, produced close to 3,100 tons of palm oil, 2,440 tons of palmetto oil and 2,640 tons of oil-cake in the last two quarters of 1979.

Compared with 1978, the 1979 traffic handled by Cotonou port was 1.4 million tons higher in unloaded goods (including 789,000 tons of fuels and 248,000 tons of clinker), and 61,200 tons of goods loaded.

In 1979 the Benin-Niger Railroad and Transports Joint Organization shipped 204,446 tons of goods including 115,144 tons of fuel products (90,733 tons to Niger beyond Parakou).

In the first 11 months of 1979 Cotonou International Airport recorded 2,950 flights of commercial aircraft, the arrival and departure of 59,785 travelers, and 4,862 tons of freight.

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The sales turnover indicator of the main commercial enterprises for the end of 1979 was 268.8 as against 227.9 the previous year (based on 1970 = 100).

On 1 January 1980 the guaranteed interprofessional minimum hourly wage was raised from 45 to 51.75 francs CFA.

In January 1980 duties and fees collected by the Customs Service totaled 1.1 billion CFA, 94 percent of which were levied on imports.

Revenues and expenditures in the 1980 fiscal budget totaled 33.8 billion CFA (+6.9 billion compared with the previous year).

At the end of December 1978 total foreign indebtedness was 31 billion CFA (-2.9 billion compared with end of 1977); the available credits totaled 41.6 billion CFA (+27 billion compared with end of 1977). Debt expenditures, amortization, principal and interest paid in 1978 totaled 1.3 billion CFA.

On 31 January 1980 notes and coins in circulation totaled 14.6 billion CFA against 10.3 billion the previous year. At the end of December 1979 short and long-term bank deposits totaled 30 billion CFA (+1.6 billion compared with end of 1978). At the same date loans to the economy totaled 59.4 billion CFA (+14.3 billion over 1978).

Also at the end of December 1979 the Benin treasury had a positive balance of 7.3 billion CFA (2.2 billion more than in 1978).

Also at the end of 1979 the net foreign assets of the Central Bank showed a negative balance of -4.8 billion CFA as a result of increased liabilities (as compared with an equally negative balance of 1.7 billion CFA the previous year).

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CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC

ALLOCATION OF EEC AID REPORTED

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 25 Jul 80  
p 1864

/Text/ We have indicated in our issue of 11 July 1980, p 1748 that the EEC would supply 13 billion CFA (44.3 million UC /EEC Unit of Account/ as a subsidy and 1.3 billion CFA (4.7 million UC) in special loans to the CAR through the EDF /Euro- pean Development Fund/.

The credits secured involve the following projects:

- Integrated development in cotton region;
- Integrated development in coffee region;
- Construction of permanent structures on the Bossembele-Bouar-Garoua Boulai and Bangui-Bambari-Bangassou-Obo highways;
- Repair of the Damara-Sibut Highway;
- Construction of slipway of the port of Bangui;
- Preparation of the premises and equipment of Bangui Lycee.

Subsidies of a regional nature, from which the CAR could additionally benefit (from 14 to 17 billion CFA francs), involve the following projects:

- Preparation of the Bangui-M'Poko Airport (lengthening the runway) in the framework of the Ndjamena-Bangui-Brazzaville line;

Preparation of navigable waterways: Haute Sangha (CAR-Cameroon-Congo); Oubangui-Congo (CAR-Congo-Zaire);

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--Repair of the Bossembele-Bossangoa-Chad frontier regional highway;

--Communication by wireless beams between the CAR and the Congo (Bangui-Impfondo link).

We have also announced that the BEI [European Investment Bank] would possibly be interested in productive investment projects in the industrial, agro-industrial, mining, tourist and energy branches, as well as in transport and telecommunications. The Central African government is also going to request the BEI's assistance in studies of industrial and agro-industrial projects; telecommunication projects, in particular, the ground telecommunications station by satellite; increasing the capital of SOCATRAF [Central African River Transport Company].

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CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC

BRIEFS

NEW CIVIL SERVICE REGULATIONS--By the 22 July decree "it is forbidden for any civil servant to have interests at hand that would compromise his independence, be that by himself, by a third person, by any name, in any enterprise controlled by his administration or service, or in relation to his administration or service". It is also forbidden for all civil servants "to carry on any other business or activities which might disturb his work and destroy his faithfulness to the public service." The same day a 1975 decree was rescinded what "obliged all Central African Republic citizens, whether natural or adoptive citizens, over the age of 18, to justify the exercising of any commercial, agricultural, or pastoral activity, with the exception of beverage ships." In addition, the Central African Republic government made a general salary increase for civil servants on 29 July. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 15 Aug 80 pp 2034] 9572

CENTRA-HYDRO MADE PUBLIC COMPANY--On 30 July Centra-Hydro once again became a national company. The government decided to terminate the contract which tied it to the Transworld Energy Company and allowed it to control 40 percent of Centra-Hydro's capital. It was made clear that Transworld Energy would be compensated. In the future, fuel supplies for the Central African Republic will be assured by the Central African Tool Company (Tocages), which will use Centra-Hydro's installations. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 15 Aug 80 pp 2034] 9572

FAC AGREEMENTS SIGNED--On 10 July the chief of the French mission of cooperation M Landry and the minister of planning and cooperation J-P Le Boudier signed an aid and cooperation fund (FAC) assistance agreement for 300 million CFA, which represent the second installment of financial aid for rural road repairs in the cotton area. This project, which started at the beginning of the year, is jointly financed by a FAC subsidy (600 million) and by a loan from the Central Bank of Economic Cooperation (300 million). The plan is to redo 1.691 km of trails and roads in order to facilitate cotton collection for the 1979-1980 campaign. A convention was signed the same day which defined the respective engagements of FAC and the Central African Government

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towards the University Institute of Forestry and Agricultural Technology (IUTAT) in Mbaiki. FAC will continue its aid to the IUTAT during the scholastic year in 1979-80, 1980-81, 1981-82, and 1982-83. The IUTAT trains rural development engineers in 4 years. FAC finances a part of the equipment and its maintenance, provides the largest number of instructors, and gives the students scholarships. French aid will decrease as the Central African government takes charge of certain sectors. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 15 Aug 80 p 2034] 9572

**FINANCIAL RECOVERY MEASURES**--At the same time that he dissolved his government, President Dacko decreed a series of measures to limit public expenditures: Reduction of allowances paid to government members. The latter will receive the same allowances which were in force before 20 September 1979; reduction of the amount of contract allowances for mission expenses, which had been raised on last 6 February; suspension of the application of the decree of 27 May 1980, determining the salaries and allowances of magistrates of the judicial category. The day before, the chief of state had sent a circular memorandum to all ministerial departments demanding strict respect for the rules of public accountability, in particular the need to proceed with a call for bids and draw up a contract for every public order above 1 million francs CFA. The failure to respect budgetary rules, which is the cause of many credit excesses, will be severely penalized from now on. The Ministry of Finance, on its part, has asked that all checks intended for payment of taxes, customs duties, products and various duties intended for the state be made out from now on to the order of the public treasury to preserve the principle of financial integrity. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 25 Jul 80 p 1864] 8490

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CHAD

#### REASONS FOR HABRE'S REPORTED GAINS NOTED

Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 13, 20 Aug 80 pp 20-21

[Article by Francois Soudan: "Why Is Hissein Habre Winning?"]

[Text] Four months of battle. Four armies. Four thousand dead, perhaps. Civil war in Chad continues to kill. Since the outbreak of the conflict at the end of March in Ndjama, it has spread over the whole of the territory. Kanem, Bata, Ouaddai, Borkou--the provinces of the Center and the North have been set on fire one by one. Only the cotton-growing South --the "useful country"--has been spared thus far. Chad has become like Lebanon and has taken up violence like a second life.

Among these warriors with glowing eyes, Gorane from the rocky desert and Tebu from the basalt mountains who can live on a handful of millet, a little tea and a few dried dates, who can travel 80 kilometers a day on foot, sleeping only 2 hours when the sun is the highest, 1 man, like it or not, stands out and dominates--Hissein Habre.

#### One Against Three

When the first spark was struck in the jurisdiction of the Ndjama provost on 21 March, no one believed at all in the survival of this son of a shepherd, who became minister of defense at 43 after 6 months in the presidency of the government, a few years of guerrilla warfare and 1 or 2 betrayals. Habre was alone at the head of his Armed Forces of the North (FAN) with the worn blue shoulder ribbons. Opposing him was "legal" Chad, i.e. the rest of the government coalition formed in November 1979, from the Popular Armed Forces (FAP) of President Goukouni to the Chadian Armed Forces (FAT) of southern leader Wadal Abdelkader Kamougue, and including the Joint Action Front (FAC) of Acyl Ahmat. The balance of forces was one against three.

#### Discipline, First of All

Once past the difficult first week, when Acyl's commandos fired the FAN pockets of resistance with flamethrowers, Hissein Habre consolidated his

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position. And 4 months later, he is still there. This mere fact almost represents a triumph. In Ndjamena, Habre is occupying the most important African city economically, the most populous and the easiest to defend. He also controls that vast supply line linking the capital with the Sudanese frontier over a distance of more than a thousand kilometers. It is a rocky track marked with garrisons at Yao, Oum Hadjer and Abeche faithful to him, along which light convoys loaded with drums of gasoline and sacks of millet travel regularly.

In a military sense, Hissein Habre even seems to have taken initiative again: the major northern settlements of Faya-Largeau and Ounianga-Kebir, in Borkou, fell into the hands of the FAN at the beginning of July, as did a good part of Kanem, along the Nigerian frontier.

The explanation for these successes--precarious, it is true--are several. First of all, remarkable organization and discipline. The command council of the FAN functions on a model of democratic centralism which is adhered to strictly: 4 or 5 days of discussion and then a decision which everyone must implement or face very harsh penalties. Hissein Habre sees to this personally, even if he has initially been opposed to the decision. The main resolutions of the council are passed on to scattered groups by radio, or sometimes by messengers driving Toyotas or on horseback. Each combatant receives a wage of about 30,000 CFA francs (600 French francs) per month, out of which he buys his food. Any act of plundering is, in theory, prohibited.

In Goukouni's forces, on the other hand, discipline is more lax. The FAP is an army in permanent discussion wherein there are no wages and almost no leaders. The few men of value such as Brahim Youssouf and Adoun Yacoub--currently in a Paris hospital being treated for an abdominal wound--are great commanders with differing political aims. One group dreams of an Islamic republic and the others of a popular one. Habre's force for its part relies on the simple, magic slogan of nationalism. It was by denouncing Libyan aid to the FAP and reminding the people of Faya and Ounianga how much they suffered in August 1978 and August 1979 from the bombing by Qadhdhafi's troops and their Chadian allies headed by Acyl Ahmat that Hissein Habre managed to rally the main notables of Borkou, previously loyal to Goukouni.

#### Alone Against Qadhdhafi

This war commander without any military training, with a degree in law and a former free auditor at political science course lectures in Paris, is a remarkable diplomat as well. With the Saudi and Kuwaiti governments, which are discreetly financing a part of his weapons purchases, he plays the role of the integral, pure and pro-Western Moslem. With the Egyptian and Sudanese authorities, who have supplied him with some weapons dropped by parachutes from C-130s over Abeche, he represents himself as the sole

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bulwark against Libyan expansionism. And finally, with the "progressives" --he has just sent an "informative mission" to the Congo and Angola--he claims to be anti-French and points to his wholehearted opposition to the "secessionist inclinations" of the South.

Money? Those who do not like him much, such as Thiam Tidjani, one of the spokesmen for the pro-Libyans in the FAC, point to "the Saudi petrodollars and the ransom for Madame Claustre, all of which he pocketed." Perhaps. To this in any case must be added the customs duties and the taxes levied in Ouaddai on wholesalers dealing with the Sudan, and the fees demanded of the foreign communities.

"The Boss"

But undeniably there remains the personal factor in the "Habre phenomenon" --charisma. This man who is tall for a Gorane, dressed in a yellow robe or fatigues with a Cuban cap, and who likes great spectacles, truly fascinates his soldiers. His strong, slow voice, his eyes, which he screws up to stress a phrase, his hands, which open out as if to wave away the puffs of hot air. Invariably, whenever he meets a politician or a journalist, his first words flow forth, carefully wrought and almost chiselled: "The situation in Chad is extremely difficult and complex . . ." And he proffers a list of charges against his adversaries.

Habre has grown much heavier since the era when he raced across the rocky terrain of Tibesti with the French army at his heels. But his soldiers, the youngest of whom are not yet 14 and who call him "The Boss," fall quiet when he speaks, as do his lieutenants: Mahamat Saleh, Mahamat Nourry, Idriss Miskine, or again Michel Froud. At Goukouni's headquarters, on the contrary, practically no one even rises when the president arrives. And when this son of a derdei, a small, hesitant man of 34, profoundly honest, courageous and capable of violent anger, gives a speech, no one pays any attention.

Will Hissein Habre be a statesman, then? It would at the very least be premature to say yes. First of all because in this civil war in which to quote Goukouni Weddeye "there must be a winner and a loser," Habre is not yet the winner. And then and above all because the South, which has for nearly 6 months existed in quasi-autarky and is moving toward de facto secession, violently rejects him. Wouldn't Habre be, in the words of the southern minister of agriculture, Mboilaou Naiambaye, "the largest common factor in the country," to which Thiam Tidjani added that "if he gains power, it will be because his French masters ordered it"? Possibly.

Don't Help Us!

Nonetheless, the French policy in this regard should be examined more closely. Certainly Habre was at one time France's man, as all the leading political and military personalities were either before or after him. But

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today? "The French are finished," one of the key experts in Chadian affairs confides. "They withdrew from Central Africa, keeping a careful eye on developments, but they no longer know whom to support. And so they are trying to support everyone without realizing that everyone will reject them." And it is true that in Paris there seem to be two approaches. At the Elysee Palace, in the entourage of Martin Kirsch, the inclination is toward legality, i.e. President Goukouni. At the Ministry of Cooperation there is talk of the useful Chad--the South--and Lieutenant Colonel Kamougue is favored. At the Quai d'Orsay, in the office of Guy Georgy, director for African affairs, and among the military who have "served" in Chad, Hissein Habre is "the only statesman in the country." In brief, the petty departmental war which has always divided French officials whenever Chad has been in question does not seem to have subsided.

For Hissein Habre, in any case, who was at the time of the "Claustre affair" and the "Galopin affair" the citizen of Chad most hated by Frenchmen, the lesson of the hesitations in Paris is clear. When he met with Jean-Philippe Ricalens, staff director for the minister of cooperation, Idriss Miskine, one of the advisers closest to Habre, broke into a smile. "You can avoid hindering us. But above all, don't help us. We will no longer accept that." It is true that France seems somehow to bring bad luck in Chad.

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CHAD

NATION MUST BE HELPED TO RESTORE UNITY DESPITE PEOPLE'S DIVERSITY

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 6 Jun 80 pp 1303-1304

[Article by Francois Gaulme]

[Text] France has withdrawn its troops and diplomats from Ndjamenas in order to establish a consulate in Moundou. Is it thus recognizing the partition of Chad which some in Paris consider inevitable?

This question, if answered in the affirmative, would at first result in offending Chad's politicians, who have always been in agreement on the idea of preserving national unity. The comparative failure of the Lagos agreement, with the "rebellion" of Hissein Habre against the other members of a government united against him, has not provoked separatist trends. Colonel Kamougue, vice president and spokesman of the "Southerners" (those who might be most expected to secede) has thus far only declared himself for an extensive decentralization and not for rupture with a unitary state having Ndjamenas as its capital.

Such an attitude embarrasses those who insist on the artificial character of Chad's frontiers. One is led to put in doubt the sincerity of the country's leaders in their declarations of unity: How can men who are so different, one maintains, reach agreement on a national sentiment which does not exist, since the country's creation is not the result of a will to live together but rather of an agreement among European colonizers, without any concern for ethnic facts? It is known that, like Namibia, North Cameroon owes the oddities of its frontiers to Germany's requirement for its African possessions to have access to certain river basins. Instead of being cut up in sections as they are today, the environs of Lake Chad were united for a long time under the dominion of the Nigerian empire of Bornou. The southern, eastern and northern frontiers of the Republic of Chad are no less arbitrary and only exist, most of the time, on paper.

Should it be said that Chad cannot be united, and that the civil war which it has known for 15 years can only be settled by a divorce?

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In general, the south is contrasted with the north, the Christian or "animist" country, provided with French language schools, with the Moslem country which speaks Arabic. For a long time, stress was put on what was called the "useful Chad," i.e., the southern region, producer of cotton and, thereby, principal source of the country's export revenues. This is to forget the economic role of stock raising, which while it does not get essential foreign currency for the country, is nonetheless the principal activity of a third of the population, a million people occupying two thirds of the national territory. French policy toward Chad since the beginning of this century has alternated between consideration first for the north, then for the south after World War II, then again for the north when just recently an all-out support for certain representatives of the south led to an impasse. The only constructive attitude today appears clearly, and especially to the Chadians themselves, to be in opposition to this dialectic of favor and disgrace. To the degree that France, or any other country or organization, wants to help Chad not only to settle its political problems but also to develop its economy, it is necessary to take into account both north and south, beef and cotton, dates and millet beer.

This development should be understood as a whole. Assuredly, without the death of Rabah, the conference of Berlin, etc., the carving up of Chadian territory would not be what it is. But it is rare for ethnic unity and national unity to coincide in the world. The former, moreover, is often only the result of an eventful history, in the course of which vanquished and conquering peoples merged. The latter is not, as a consequence, an original fact: it is formed little by little (in France) or rapidly (in the United States) from a common will.

One could say that Chad is the victim of its long history. While its present unity has not avoided civil war, one hardly sees what could replace it. The centralized states which formed since the European Middle Ages in the northern part of the country were only new edifices, getting nourishment from the substance of what they destroyed. It would be as vain to dream today of reconstituting the Quaddai as of reconstituting the kingdom of Congo or the empire of Monomotapa in other parts of Africa.

The map of Chadian populations, however schematic it may be, shows that, while it is conceivable if necessary to find unity in the Sara group, despite tensions which could be produced in its midst, a North Chadian entity which would be created with respect for differences among peoples and languages would take on the aspect of a pile of scrap iron. Aside from Islam and recent progress of the Arab language, the Moslem north is not united.

As A. Le Rouvreur noted almost 20 years ago in his book "Saheliens et Sahariens du Tchad," it is hardly possible to distinguish the country's north and south by "one characteristic alone," although these characteristics are "always very clear." There are four main zones in the North, he wrote further: a northern zone occupied by the Tedas, nomadic camel drivers or settled Saharan oasis dwellers; a mixed zone of Dazas (related to the Tedas) and black or

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white "Arabs" (camel and ox drivers); a zone traversed by black Arab ox drivers; a southern zone, occupied by a great number of black peoples, sometimes Arab and generally settled. Le Rouvreur believed in a possible unity of the north, because of trade relations creating interdependence between the peoples. He recognized that it had not been achieved.

Next to the herders and the Arab conquerors live subject or Islamicized peoples. The Mabas of the Ouaddai, whom their Arab masters have called Waday, represent a very old people, considerably preceding the creation of the sultanate. The Kotokos of the Chari shores, today Moslems, are descendants of the Saos, who left traces of their ancient civilization all around Lake Chad. Finally, the Hadjeray group ("mountain people" in Arabic), formed from various ethnic groups, resists Arabization in the natural fortress which it occupies in the Melfi region. The nomadic pastoral Peuls, whom one finds a few of everywhere in the center of Chad, should also be mentioned. They have a West African culture, foreign [to the area] but faithfully preserved.

The need of these peoples for mutual acceptance can foreshadow the psychological climate which alone would permit a return to peace in Chad.

To divide the country would in fact, we believe, depending on what precedes it, be tantamount to opening Pandora's box, and for uncertain advantages, letting incalculable evils escape which would soon spread over Chad and neighboring countries; Cameroon, to give just one example, keeps its unity only by a constant effort because of its great ethnic diversity.

But it would be a dangerous temptation to believe that peace will be made and unity found again through a Moslem conquest of the whole country. This could not happen before the end of the rainy season, next November, whatever the issue of the Ndjamena fights. It would lead to a blood bath. Very happily, President Goukouni Oueddei and his government have never made any declaration which would lead one to think that the peoples of the south may be menaced in their Christian faith and their very lives within any specific period of time. As to Mr Hissein Habre, he had to abandon his project of invading the south in 1979.

Contrary to what the Moslems of the north and sometimes, alas, some French administrators, believed for too long, the Saras and the different ethnic groups practicing agriculture along the Cameroon frontier are not backward peoples, good only for becoming slaves. Their social condition, their agricultural techniques, their traditional beliefs make them typical representatives of a black African civilization, very different from that of the Arabs or of groups related to the Berbers like the Tedas, but in no way inferior to theirs.

Through the agricultural potentials of their country and the availability of their arms [i.e., manual labor], the Saras especially have paid a heavy tribute to colonization, which forced them both to cultivate cotton for export and to participate in big projects like Congo-Ocean. They were

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confronted with the accelerated introduction of schools and Christianization, which was not without harm. The personality of President Tombalbaye illustrates well the psychological drama resulting from this situation: young "modern" deputy favoring socialism, fervent Protestant, he wanted, before independence, to forbid a French ethnologist from participating in the "Yondo" initiation of the Sara youth. Later, just before his assassination, he foundered in madness by persecuting his own people and preaching a return to sources which included initiation of public officials to the Yondo.

Chad is today partially Christian. The country's north is not all Moslem either, and it was while doing research on pre-Islamic tombs that Mme Claustre became the prisoner of Hissein Habre. This country, such as it is, has a long history and diverse human riches, sometimes opposed but not incompatible at the price of good will. Africa and the international community must contribute to finding again this national unity, this peace which the Chadians seek (let us not doubt it, but many keep silent today), rather than to speculating on hatred or the dismantling of the state.

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CHAD

BRIEFS

GOVERNMENT FORCES CONTROL--The Bokoro and Moito settlements, some 250 kilometers east of Ndjamena, so far held by the Armed Forces of the North (FAN) of Hissein Habre have fallen "under the total control of government forces," the Chad National Liberation Front (FROLINAT) announced in Paris on 5 August. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 15 Aug 80 p 2035] 5157

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COMORO ISLANDS

INCOMPETENCE OF GOVERNMENT, OPPOSITION ACTIVITIES REPORTED

Paris AFRIQUE-ASIE in French 18 Aug 80 pp 106-107

[Article by Elie Ramaro: "The End of the Curse?"]

[Text] There has been no opposition demonstration in the Comoro Islands since May 1978 and until very recently, with the exception of some incidents which were quickly squashed. There are many important reasons for this among which we must mention the repression instituted upon orders of the mercenary Bob Denard who had conducted a coup d'etat for former president Ahmed Abdallah in an effort to return the latter to power and to move the island group closer to France. Ali Soilih, the leader of the Comorian socialist revolution, had been rubbed out by the mercenaries and most of his faithful followers were imprisoned.

Return of the Stick

The vast treason among the cadres of the old revolutionary regime--many of whom in fact had plotted against Soilih, while the others adopted a rather cautious wait-and-see attitude, until such time as they could switch to a "new" regime--only added to the disarray. This disarray caused trouble among young people who were the main supporters of Soilih's policy and who had to return to their families, obey the chiefs and notables--or else they would be in trouble and might even be banished from their villages. Another cause of the difficulties sprang from the absence of a sufficiently representative personality who--underground or in exile--would have emerged as the continuation of the socialist regime. Finally, Ali Soilih--whose personal courage and political genius certainly cannot be doubted--had undoubtedly wanted to do too much, too soon, while getting his support from very young and inexperienced militants. He also made the mistake of trusting certain French or Indian business circles entirely too much--for lack of anybody else to trust--and those circles, under the cover of "neutrality" toward the revolution, in fact conspired against it, so as to bring it down.

Just 2 years after the catastrophe, all of these phenomena weighed even more heavily on those who, in one form or another, wanted to resume the struggle for a true liberation of the Comoro Islands--and all of the old

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questions still remain. But there are other elements which explain the awakening discovered in recent months inside the island group and in most of the foreign towns where the Comorians live.

One must first of all underscore the inability of President Ahmed Abdallah to formulate objectives and a program for the country and to refrain from personally conducting his own business affairs--Abdallah is the richest merchant in the island group--while the population returned to its state of "nondevelopment," as during the time of direct colonization by France.

In turn, the administration--paralyzed, devoid of imagination and competence and once again invaded by French technical assistants--without saying so had to go back and pick up a portion of the solutions recommended by Ali Soilih. The foreigners, especially the French, returned to the archipelago in force. But the population blames them for the secession of the Island of Mayotte, a festering wound in the heart of the Comorians. (Since last May, a series of cooperation agreements was signed between Paris and Moroni. These agreements involve all aspects of the island group's existence (economy, social affairs, military). These agreements, step by step, correspond to those which France, starting in 1960, had imposed upon most of its former colonies and which many countries thereafter, especially Madagascar, have challenged.)

The absence of any positive evolution in the situation, while the "re-colonization" of the island by Paris keeps growing stronger--a process which had enabled the French to get a foothold in the islands already during the 18th century--is a permanent factor of crisis for the current regime. The same is true of the lack of respectability of the current Comorian regime in the eyes of international instances and the opprobrium to which it is subjected from the African states (especially Madagascar, the Seychelles, Tanzania, and Mozambique--its closest neighbor) for having agreed to "put in as king" one of the unanimously most detested European mercenaries who ever swept the continent.

Other Ali Soilihs

This is the background against which Comorian voices have been heard just about everywhere, calling for the replacement of the current regime, which is a simple rehash of the old "autonomous government" prior to independence and which has no future before it, because of the advanced age of most of its leaders.

In AFRIQUE-ASIE (No 216, 23 June 1980), the National United Front of the Comoro Islands, based in Dar-Es-Salaam (where it had established the old National Liberation Movement of the Comoro Islands, or Molinaco, already prior to independence) published an "open letter to Ahmen Abdallah" containing the following passage in particular: "Kick the dogs of war of Bob Denard out of the Comoro Islands. French influence must be terminated as quickly as possible. The honor and dignity of the Comorians

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are at stake." And the FNUC [National United Front of the Comoro Islands] added: "Ali Soilih has left us; But other Ali Soilihs are coming up."

The OJC (Comorian Youth Organization), whose executive committee is located in Algiers, recently contacted the chiefs of state who met for the OAU summit in Freetown and reminded them that Ahmed Abdallah had sold out Mayotte, recognizing French authority over that Comorian island in fact. In France, the OJC also circulated a "letter to Comorian workers," written in their language, recalling the fate of the political prisoners, as well as Ahmed Abdallah's responsibility for the current deadlock. It finally wrote to the members of the special court created by Abdallah to "judge" --nobody knows when--the prisoners, reminding them that the 50 or so men held on charges of supporting the Soilih regime are in prison because of their ideas.

In Paris, a Committee of Solidarity with Political Prisoners was created upon the initiative of the Association of the Friends of the Comorian People (14, rue de Nanteuil, 75015 Paris). A support petition is being circulated among French left-wing circles. The association's newspaper, COMORES-INFORMATION, is now coming out with its fifth issue and continues to publish lists of prisoners and analyses on the political situation in the archipelago.

This publication is being circulated secretly in the Comoro Islands, like our journal AFRIQUE-ASIE--which of course may not be sold either--and little bulletins such as LA VOIX DU PEUPLE which particularly denounces the role played by Abdou M'Daouhomo, alias "Masuruwali," heading the Federal Security Bureau (the Comorian political police). At the end of June, after endless negotiations, a lawyer from the international human rights league was able to get into the Comoro Islands but he was not authorized to meet with the prisoners.

In France, the ASEC (Association of Comorian Students and Trainees), which was hostile to Ali Soilih, and which at one time seemed to prefer the regime of Ahmed Abdallah over his, all things considered equal, in turn protested against the attacks on human rights of which two of its members were victims in the Comoro Islands.

These as yet unorganized initiatives nevertheless contribute to discrediting the Comorian regime on the international scene. For the militants at home, who are so far forced to operate underground and proceed very cautiously, they also constitute encouragement to speak out. The striking workers of Bambao, the exploited small peasants in the villages of the interior, the high school students at Moroni know now that they are no longer alone and that there is no longer any curse on their courageous struggle which is the promise of better days to come. And their voice will no longer be stifled.

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CONGO

AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTS HARVESTING, PRODUCTION CAMPAIGN 1980--1981

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 15 Aug 80 pp 2036, 2037

[Text] The Politburo, meeting on 1 August, examined a dossier pertaining to the Congo's 1980-1981 agricultural products campaign. Decisions made in this area by the Politburo were as follows:

1) Coffee- Cocoa: Deforestation of 1,600 ha to create new plantations (600 ha of coffee, 1,000 ha of cocoa); granting of material and seeds to planters; fighting against coffee tree and cocoa tree diseases. These steps taken in favor of coffee and cocoa production (approximately 224 million CFA) will be provided for by the OCC (Coffee and Cocoa Office).

Buying prices have been raised 15 percent for the 1980-1981 campaign (beginning in September for coffee and October for cocoa). The new prices are (FCFA/ kilo): a) coffee: husked Robusta, 172; cherry Robusta, 120; Arabica, 184; b) cocoa: superior, 220; average, 154; passable, 110; junk, 55.

Production for the 1980-81 campaign has been estimated at 2,200t of cocoa and 720t of coffee.

2) Palmetto: Holding of the buying price at 33 F CFA / kilo. Production is estimated at 610t. The government has decided to refurbish the palm groves of the National administration of palm groves of the Congo (RNPC).

3) Tobacco: Tobacco production affects close to 8,000 planters (636 t in 1979). A 700t production has been estimated for 1980-81. The government has been requested to present a plan for an increase in production.

In the meantime, prices to the producers were up slightly (+5 percent compared to the last campaign price): First quality, 178 F CFA/kilo; Second quality, 121; Third quality, 63.

4) Peanuts: The Politburo has indicated a goal of 3,000t for the 1980-81 campaign. Producer prices have gone up (+25 percent): peanuts in shells, 75 F CFA/kilo; shelled peanuts, 100. Part of the expected production will supply the N'Kayi oil-works.

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CONGO

BRIEFS

FINANCIAL AGREEMENT WITH FRANCE--A financial agreement for the sum of 7.5 billion CFA francs was signed on 8 August between France and the Congo. This agreement pertains to health services. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 15 Aug 80 p 2037] 9572

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DJIBOUTI

BRIEFS

WELLS REOPENED, WATER IMPROVEMENT--According to an old legend, known by all the people of Djibouti, the former inhabitants of the region of Grand-Barra supposedly plugged up the source which supplied water to Grand-Barra Lake--which is now dried out. Curious to look into the truth of this story, commissioner of the republic for the district of Kikhil, Osman Roble [illegible words in photostat] launched a search to discover the exact place where the source supposedly was plugged up. Teams have been working in the indicated places for about 10 days. The site, spotted with the help of information gathered through the commissioner of the republic, is located 24 kilometers from the town of Dikhil, crossing the plain of Balambaley. It is located in Wadi Dhadhahilou, a tributary of Wadi Mouloud. The existence of five shallow wells, with water coming out permanently, encouraged the commissioner. Only one of these wells is now in use; due to lack of maintenance, the other four wells are covered with a nauseating slime, similar to the kind that comes from a cesspool of waste water. "If I remember correctly, the spring is located between these two wells," said Guire Arale, a 90-year old senior citizen whom the commissioner took to the place. "When I was young, I would take the herd here," he said, "and I recall that the diameter of the main well was as big as these two wells together." This was thus the specific spot where it was necessary to dig to a depth of about 2 meters in order to find the spring--provided it was there at all. But before that, the commissioner ordered his men to clean out all wells so that they would be useful. We are thus impatiently looking forward to the result of this courageous prospecting initiative. If it were to be successful, it is certain that the appearance of this land, which today is arid and very inhospitable especially for the herds of the nomads, would be rapidly transformed and a different kind of life could develop here. In any case, the operation is already beneficial to the region's population because a good trail has now been built, thus considerably facilitating access in case of emergency assistance; and the commissioner promised the construction of shelters for the animals after all the wells have been restored; those wells furthermore will be covered and protected against the weather and that should enormously reduce the waiting time and the "bottlenecks."--[Text] [Djibouti LA NATION DJIBOUTI in French 28 Aug 80 p 3] 5058

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MORE DROUGHT VICTIMS--In the district of Dikhil alone, 6,000 drought victims have been registered so far, including 2,500 in a camp opened for this purpose at Yoboki, with 2,500 at As-Eyla and more than 1,000 at Mouloud. "Considering the current rate of arrival in the camps where we give them food and care, we expect the figure to exceed 10,000 during the coming months," the republic commissioner for the district told us.--  
[Text] [Djibouti LA NATION DJIBOUTI in French 28 Aug 80 p 3] 5058

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EQUATORIAL GUINEA

CHIEF OF STATE THANKS PRC, FRANCE, NEIGHBORS FOR AID

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 15 Aug 80 p 2035

[Report: "First Anniversary of the Coup d'Etat"]

[Text] On 2 and 3 August Equatorial Guinea celebrated the first anniversary of the coup d'etat (freedom coup) which overthrew on 3 August 1979 the old dictator Macias Nguema. The official guests attending the ceremonies included Paul Biya, prime minister of Cameroon, General Gutierrez Mellado, Spanish deputy prime minister, Mrs Luo Shusen, Chinese deputy minister of posts and telecommunications, and Martin Kirsch, advisor to the French chief of state for African affairs.

In a speech delivered on this occasion, on 2 August, the chief of state, Lt Col Obiang Nguema Mbazogo emphasized the role of Spain "without which," he said, "our revolution could not have taken place." He thanked that country for its "human and financial" aid. On this occasion, he announced that Madrid was to build the first university in Equatorial Guinea in Malabo. President Obiang also praised the aid of France "whose presence in our country," said he, "provides great stimulation." The aid provided by China and the reestablishment of relations with the United States were equally mentioned.

After expressing his gratitude to Gabon and Cameroon for having welcomed thousands of refugees who fled under the dictatorship of Macias, he asserted that there were no longer any political prisoners or "true exiles." On this subject, the president asked his compatriots still living abroad to return to the country which "needs them."

In the area of economics, the Equatorial Guinea chief of state announced that henceforth the purchase price of cocoa for the producers will be fixed so that the peasants will no longer be "frustrated." On this subject he recalled that the cocoa bean production which was 40,000 tons at the time of independence had dropped to 4,000 tons last year.

Following the civilian and military parades, on 3 August President Obiang Nguema opened the new Malabo International Communications Center built by the PRC. This complete modern important infrastructure will allow

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Equatorial Guinea henceforth to be connected with Europe and Africa through the international communications network; the center will also greatly improve internal communications. The Equatorial Guinea chief of state cheered the work done by the PRC which has also built a power plant in Bata, the asphalted Noue-Mongomo Road (120 kilometers), two new radio stations in Bata and one soon to be completed in Malabo.

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EQUATORIAL GUINEA

IMF ECONOMIC AID APPROVED

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 25 Jul 80  
p 1863

[Text] The IMF approved at the beginning of July a confirmation agreement authorizing Equatorial Guinea to purchase during the next year an amount equivalent to 5.5 million SDR [Special Drawing Rights] to support the economic stabilization program adopted by its government.

In addition, the fund agreed to Equatorial Guinea purchasing in the framework of the compensatory financing mechanism an amount equivalent to 6.4 million SDR, because of the failure of exports to increase in the year which ended in May 1980, which was due, to a great extent, to a drop in the volume of cacao exports.

The IMF emphasizes that Equatorial Guinea faces a difficult economic situation. In recent years, the production and export of cacao, the country's most important export product, declined sharply, while production of other important export products such as coffee and lumber also dropped markedly. This decrease of agricultural production had serious repercussions in all branches of the economy and it was accompanied by a reduction of foreign investment.

The government's economic stabilization program aims at increasing agricultural production and reestablishing the productive capacity of other branches of the economy. To achieve these objectives, the authorities have adopted a complete and detailed series of measures, both in the financial and monetary field, as well as in that of exchange and trade, measures which aim at suitably encouraging production, reestablishing financial stability and allowing a liberalization of the system of exchanges and payments.

Equatorial Guinea's share in the fund is 10 million SDR. The financial obligations of this country to the fund are based on previous operations and transactions, which are now equivalent to 1.76 million SDR.

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ETHIOPIA

BRIEFS

COOPERATION WITH CUBA--On 9 July, the Ethiopian minister of Transportation announced that a draft agreement between Cuba and Ethiopia had been signed concerning the opening of an airline between the two countries. On his way back from Havana where he attended a meeting of the Ethiopian-Cuban commission, the minister also stated that measures had been taken to improve telecommunications between the two countries. Cuba, he added, has agreed to send an increased number of teachers and physicians to Ethiopia, and the number of grants to Ethiopian students will be increased. In addition, the Cuban government has given Ethiopia laboratory equipment and drugs amounting to one million dollars. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 18 Jul 80 p 1809] 9294

TREATY WITH BULGARIA--Bulgaria and Ethiopia have signed a friendship and cooperation treaty aimed at strengthening their political, economic, commercial and cultural ties; this was announced in a communique released on 15 July in Sofia and Addis Ababa, following the visit to Bulgaria of the Ethiopian president, Mengistu Haile Mariam. The two countries have also signed a consular agreement and have agreed on the main lines of their economic, scientific and technical cooperation during the next five years. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 18 Jul 80 p 1809] 9294

LOAN FROM ADB--According to the Ethiopian minister of Finances, Mr Teferra Wolde Semayat, the latest loan granted to Ethiopia by the African Development Bank (ADB), i.e. 10 million dollars, has raised the total Ethiopian debt to ADB to 70 million dollars. Until now, these low-interest loans have been used to develop water resources, electric power, agriculture, industries and the roads. The latest loan, approved at the 16th session of ADB in Abidjan, will aid in the construction of 960 km of rural roads in the provinces of Bale and Sidamo, in southern Ethiopia. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 25 Jul 80 p 1869] 9294

SWEDISH FOOD AID--Sweden has promised to grant emergency aid of \$1.9 million to the victims of the drought in Ethiopia. This aid will be transmitted via the World Food Program (WFP). [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 20 Jun 80 p 1575] 9550

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GUINEA-BISSAU

BRIEFS

POLITICAL OPPONENTS IN COURT--The trials of the members of the commando opposing the regime in Guinea-Bissau, detained in November 1978, opened at the Military Tribunal of Guinea-Bissau on 31 July. The commando, which infiltrated Guinea-Bissau from the northern border was headed by Malam Sanha and Rafael Barbosa, both from the African Independence Party of Guinea-Bissau and Cape Verde (PAIGC). According to official Bissau sources the commandoes' target was the physical elimination of the country's leaders, engaging in sabotage, establishing a neocolonial system, and stopping the process of unification undertaken between Guinea-Bissau and Cape Verde. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 8 Aug 80 p 1972] 5157

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IVORY COAST

STRUCTURE OF ECONOMY DISCUSSED

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 22 Aug 80 pp 2079-2080

[Text] The Chamber of Industry of the Ivory Coast recently published its annual report for 1980, containing especially statistics for the period of October 1978-September 1979.

Overall, 619 production enterprises were counted as of 1 October 1979, compared to 553 a year before and 513 as of 1 October 1977. The total includes 137 bakeries and 50 printing plants but does not include small crafts establishments. On the whole, the number of enterprises in operation more than doubled over a period of 11 years.

The total capital used came to 113.6 billion CFA [African Financial Community], as against 95 billions on 1 October 1978 (up 20 percent). Cumulative investments came to 459.8 billion CFA, an increase of 39 percent over the end of September 1978 (329.7 Billions).

The business volume of the 619 enterprises covered by the census, including taxes, came to 650.4 billion CFA for the period of October 1978 until September 1979, as against 549.9 Billions for the corresponding prior period of time. In this 18-percent increase from one physical year to the next, price inflation accounts for about 5 percent and the increase in the output, in terms of volume, comes to more than 12 percent.

The overall business volume can be broken down into 69 percent sales in the Ivory Coast (70.2 percent previously) and 31 percent exports (compared to 30 percent). In 1978-1979, industrial exports represented 37 percent of the total Ivorian exports, compared to 32 percent and 26 percent, respectively, for the prior physical years.

The use of raw materials of Ivorian origin comes to about 58 percent of the business volume achieved by the industrial sector while imported raw material accounts for 42 percent.

The industrial decentralization program which has been launched will not make itself felt fully until the next several physical years, as the sugar refineries and coffee hulling plants, established in the interior, "

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gradually go into operation. For the period of 1978-1979, the overall business volume can be broken down to the extent of 66 percent for Abidjan, 8 percent at Bouake and 26 percent in the rest of the Ivory Coast.

As of 1 October 1979, the work force in the industrial sector totaled 67,443 units [workers] (up 5 percent), including 73 percent Ivorians, 24 percent Africans of other nationalities, and 3 percent non-Africans. The Ivorianization of jobs is being promoted year after year and the percentage of immigrants keeps declining. The total wage volume came to 75.2 billion CFA for FY 1978-1979 (up 19 percent).

Broken down by activity branches, the capital of Ivorian industrial enterprises as of 1 October 1979 was broken down into the following percentages: textile and clothing industries (15 percent), miscellaneous food industries and tobacco (12 percent), canning and food preparation plants (10 percent), lumber industries (9 percent), nutritional fats (7 percent), petroleum refining and by products manufacture (7 percent), chemical industry (7 percent), cereals and flour processing (5.1 percent), rubber industry establishments (5 percent), beverage and ice cream manufacturing (4 percent), construction and repair of transportation equipment (4 percent), electrical energy and water (4 percent), construction materials manufacture (3 percent), miscellaneous mechanical and electrical industry establishments (3 percent), miscellaneous industrial establishments (3 percent), leather and footwear industry establishments (1 percent), and steel industry and initial metal processing (1 percent).

The most important cumulative investments were devoted to electrical and water energy (143.4 billions CFA), the textile industry (49.5 billions), food and tobacco industries (40.8 billions), lumber industry (36.5 billions), nutritional fats (31 billions), petroleum refining (30.8 billions), canning plants (28.2 billions), cereal and flour processing (20.3 billions), chemical industries (19.7 billions), mechanical and electrical industry establishments (12.8 billions), etc.

Among the 619 enterprises, one particular one--Electric Energy of Ivory Coast--invested 139.5 billion CFA (30 percent of the total); three others committed 20-40 billions, each, (18 percent), while eight put up between 5 and 20 billions, each (15 percent).

As of the end of September 1979, 29 enterprises (public and private sectors) had made investments in excess of 2 billion CFA, broken down as follows: Energie electrique de la Cote d'Ivoire, Societe de developpement des plantations de canne a sucre et d'industrialisation du sucre, Societe ivoirienne de raffinage, Palminindustrie, Etablissements R. Gonfreville, groupe Blohorn, la Cotonniere ivoirienne, Societe multinationale des bitumes, Societe de limonaderie et de brasserie d'Afrique, Brasseries de la Cote d'Ivoire, Union industrielle des cafes, Union industrielle textile de la Cote d'Ivoire, Produits de cacao de Cote d'Ivoire, Compagnie ivoirienne pour le developpement textile, Compagnie africaine de preparations alimentaires et dietetiques, Societe de distribution d'eau de la Cote

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d'Ivoire, Societe ivoirienne de transformation des tabacs, Ateliers de Kahankro, Societe ivoirienne de trituration de graines oleagineuses et de raffinage d'huiles vegetales, Societe ivoirienne de textiles artificiels et synthetiques, Grands moulins d'Abidjan, Societe des ananas de Cote d'Ivoire, Societe d'etudes et de realisations pour l'industrie cafeiere et cacaoyere, Societe africaine de cacao, Societe industrielle textile de la Cote d'Ivoire, Uniwax, Societe ivoirienne d'engrais, Impressions sur tissus de Cote d'Ivoire and Novalim (of the Nestle Group).

Parallel to the Ivorianization of personnel, the distribution of the overall capital of the industrial enterprises reflects constant progress for domestic public and private interests.

Since 1 October 1977, the distribution of the registered capital of companies covered by the census (lumber industry establishments included) developed as follows, in percentages:

	1 Oct 1977	1 Oct 1978	1 Oct 1979
Ivorian state	33.23	33.01	32.38
Private Ivorians	11.92	11.85	13.19
France	35.98	33.98	31.94
United States	2.65	3	2.88
Switzerland	4	5.76	5.49
Holland	1.2	1.10	
Senegal	0.12	--	0.21
Lebanon	2.25	2.47	2.72
Japan	0.77	0.75	0.66
Benelux	2.01	1.86	2.46
West Germany	1.20	1.22	1.57
Italy	0.53	0.52	0.52
Great Britain	0.37	1.20	1.66
Israel	0.51	0.33	0.21
Canada	0.21	--	0.16
Hong-Kong	0.13	0.11	0.16
Formosa	--	--	--
Austria	--	--	0.11
Upper Volta	--	0.13	0.62

Thus, the Ivorian portion accounts for 45.57 percent of the constituted registered capital in the industrial sector (44.66 percent as of 1 October 1978). The miscellaneous column heading includes capital contributions of varied origin, such as Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Cape Verde, Ghana, Norway, Denmark, etc.

During the FY running from October 1978 until September 1979, all activity branches, with the exception of the canning plants (down 8 percent), registered an improvement in their business volume; the increase was particularly noticeable for cereal and flour processing (up 73 percent), footwear production (up 47 percent), beverages (up 31 percent), food and tobacco industry establishments (up 29 percent), petroleum refining

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(up 25 percent), chemical industry (up 21 percent), and electrical and mechanical industries (up 21 percent).

The export rate was particularly high concerning the canning plants (88 percent), the rubber industry establishments (76 percent), petroleum refining (47 percent), cereal and flour (44 percent), nutritional foods (39 percent), lumber industries (37 percent), and textile industries (32 percent).

Eleven enterprises employed between 1,000 and 4,000 workers, each (nine, in the past).

The "Annuaire 1980 de la Chambre d'industrie de Cote d'Ivoire" contains production data for 22 industrial activity branches, the establishment of enterprises and supplementary data (capital and distribution, origin, cumulative investments, business volume, export figures, number of workers, wages paid out as of the start of 1965).

#### Construction and Public Works Sector

The 1980 industrial yearbook also presents a compilation of construction and public works enterprises, prepared jointly by the Chamber of Industry and the Union of Entrepreneurs and manufacturers of Ivory Coast.

The construction and public works sector's share out of the gross domestic output came to 9 percent for FY 1978-1979 as against 7 percent for the preceding fiscal year.

As of 1 October 1979, a total of 328 enterprises had been counted as operating actively (local enterprises and branches and agencies of foreign companies). Their cumulative investments came to 101.1 billion CFA, as against 71.4 billions a year before (up 42 percent).

The total business volume, including taxes, came to 349 billion CFA, as against 309 (up 13 percent).

The average labor force came to 56,967, including 33,495 Ivorians, 21,023 miscellaneous Africans, and 2,449 non-Africans. This is an increase of 23 percent; the total wage volume paid out came to 73.6 billion CFA.

Overall, the registered capital of the construction and public workers enterprises came to 27.2 billion CFA, as against 21.2 billions at the end of September 1978; this capital developed as follows, in terms of percentages, broken down by origin.



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	End September 1978	End September 1979
France	65.6	54.9
Ivorian State	14.9	14.7
Private Ivorians	8.7	10
Argentina	--	6.4
Norway	5.1	4
Switzerland	--	3.2
Israel	2.7	3.2
United States	--	1.2
Italy	0.4	0.8
Denmark	0.9	0.7
Belgium	0.3	0.5

The public works and civil engineering enterprises show up in first place both in terms of their investments (43.1 billions) and their business volume (143.8 billions); next come the construction enterprises with 16 billion CFA in investments and 100 billions in business volume.

There were two enterprises each of which came up with a business volume in excess of 20 billion CFA; five others topped 10 billion CFA, each. During FY 1978-1979, one enterprise employed an average work force of more than 5,000 workers while four others employed between 2,000 and 5,000 workers.

Like the industrial yearbook, the 1980 construction and public works report furnishes analyses of the ten activity groups (names and places, origin and distribution of capital, investments, business volume, manpower and wages paid out, all broken down by years).

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IVORY COAST

COMMENTARY ON NEW 'CULTURAL REVOLUTION'

Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 13-20 Aug 80 p 12

[Commentary: "The Grumbling of Ivory Coast Cadres"]

[Text] The "cultural revolution" in the Ivory Coast (JEUNE AFRIQUE No 1016) has naturally triggered a variety of reactions, not all of them positive.

We deemed it interesting to present the viewpoint of cadres which welcome the political measures adopted by the National Council of the PDCI-RDA [Democratic Party of the Ivory Coast-African Democratic Rally] on 12 June 1980, but who are disappointed by the administrative measures. Many of them have not welcomed the "denationalization" of state owned companies and have been worried by the fact that their wages may be equated to those of public officials.

We were quite sorry for the cadres who welcomed the decision of the President of the Republic to make salaries paid by state companies equal to those of public officials. What will this bring to the public officials? Nothing. Therefore, why not do the opposite? Yes, why not raise the salaries of public officials to the level of the cadres of state owned companies? Unquestionably, this might turn out to be quite expensive, particularly considering the present circumstances, some may say. However, it should be admitted that an engineer earns 150,000 CFA francs as a public official, while Sicogi charges 120,000 CFA francs monthly for an apartment.

We believe that it would be more equitable to set up an Interoccupational Guaranteed Minimum Wage for all personnel categories. Personnel who would exceed this level would have their salaries frozen. Conversely, those below that level would have their salaries raised. We sincerely believe that an engineer who starts with a salary of 300,000 CFA francs working for the administration or a state company would be right on the level of the Interoccupational Guaranteed Minimum Wage. In any case, let us stop comparing personnel in the Ivory Coast with personnel in Upper

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Volta or Mali for the sake of claiming that the former are well paid. The same could be said of deputies and other ministers of the Ivory Coast compared with their colleagues in neighboring countries.

It is not a question of engaging in sterile polemics but of making everyone aware of the salient fact that a cadre in the Ivory Coast, even if he is to live modestly, should receive a minimum wage for a proper life (SMVC) of 300,000 CFA francs monthly.

The government is aware of the fact that this "SMVC" is, unfortunately, quite above that of public officials. This is confirmed by salary raises in sectors which could be described as safety valves: the army, whose pay is being periodically raised, and the teachers whose salaries are flexible and who receive housing.

Therefore, why try to hoax some while giving privileges to others? Regardless of everything we have said, we must acknowledge that most public officials live quite well. Why? The answer is obvious: They subsist through misappropriations, fraud, and speculations.

Should we be surprised? Whatever professional conscience an individual might have, if his monthly take does not allow him to meet his most pressing needs he will engage in all kinds of speculations to survive. Should this become the general practice?

As to the dissolution of state companies such as the AVB and the ARSO, this had become so urgent that one asks why was it not accomplished sooner. From the very beginning their purposes should have been clearly defined and planned in such a way as to foresee, should they fail, the reemployment of their personnel in order to avoid increased unemployment or underpayments. However, the point at which even a clear mind becomes confused is when the following state companies are dissolved:

- AGRIPAC: We know, for example, that the chronic shortage of food in some parts of the country can be explained only in terms of poor distribution. A company such as AGRIPAC, restructured and properly managed, would be perfectly viable;

- BNEDT: Everyone knows that the development of a country is based on planning and the extensive study of the plans. It seems to us that a study agency would be indispensable. What makes this even truer is that the BNEDT was dissolved while the BCET, its precise duplicate, was created;

- SODERIZ, DISTRIPAC, and SODEPRA, and others, were all treated identically.

Naturally, it would be easy to denounce the notorious deficiencies of state or para-state companies, poorly managed by incompetent or careless

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personnel, etc. The problem is that most such companies were set up for the sake of individuals rather than the national interest.

The results have been misappropriations and waste. Unable to act against the protected individuals, the government would always prefer to close down the enterprise to the detriment of millions of poor innocent employees. The people of the Ivory Coast are ready to make sacrifices for the sake of the country but not at all cost or without everyone discharging his responsibilities.

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KENYA

BRIEFS

RURAL EMPLOYMENT--The Kenyan government has decided to promote employment in the rural areas in order to stop the migration of their population to the cities. In the course of a conversation held in Nairobi with Australian Minister for Health M. J. R. MacKellar, who was visiting Kenya, Kenyan President Daniel Arap Moi indicated that 90 percent of the country's population lives in rural areas. He pointed out that he wished for the population to understand that the country's economy was in its hands. Technological institutes built in all Kenyan provinces should allow the rural youth to develop its individual talents without mandatorily crowding the cities. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 15 Aug 80 p 2038] 5157

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MADAGASCAR

FOREIGN TRADE OFFICIAL INTERVIEWED

Paris AFRIQUE-ASIE in French 18 Aug 80 pp 94-95

[Interview with Miss Leonie Guerra, director, foreign trade, Malagasy Ministry of Economy and Commerce: "Diversified Trade"]

[Text] [Question] Considering the current state of Madagascar's foreign trade, what are your immediate concerns, considering the available resources already put to work?

Leonie Guerra: As far as resources are concerned, first of all, we established structures, we adopted legislation and we reorganized what existed before. In particular, from the very beginning, we nationalized all of the big foreign, mostly French outfits which were conducting a policy in Madagascar which was primarily determined in Europe. Their names speak for themselves: Lyonnaise, Marseillaise, Rochefortaise de Madagascar.

Our major concern thus is to restore our balance of trade while trying to satisfy the country to the maximum extent. We had to switch from a commercial structure geared toward the outside to control not only over international trade but also over our own production and our domestic sales system which constitute the foundations for the new economic order.

Like any nation which experienced colonization, it was necessary--after the rupture of the "drain" of commodities to the big export ports, heading for the colonial home countries--to create conditions for maintaining the existing level and pace of production (essentially colonial and harvest products) while concentrating our efforts on the promotion of new products necessary to meet domestic needs, with the possibility of sale on foreign markets.

[Question] On the threshold of the era of socialist cooperatives within decentralized communities, how do you expect to inspire the producers in order to persuade them to become big exporters?

Leonie Guerra: We are working first of all to create a spirit, an impetus favorable to exports among the growers at the base. Our government agencies have now switched from administrative work to intensive promotional efforts, using the media.

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In a few years we will see that the producer, who is sensitive to this kind of action, will likewise become a big economic operator. While being present and active in the various economic and commercial circuits, we attach great importance to making the country's major economic agents fully aware of what is involved.

Where our job is tough is on the regional level because work in the area of foreign trade cannot be a matter of carrying out orders coming from a dusty and anonymous office in the capital.

The opening of the production region regarding the prospects offered by foreign markets remains one of the vital tasks in foreign trade. It calls for the mobilization of each little wheel in the local administrative and commercial structures and above all the decentralized communities on the level of each faritany. These criteria are the conditions that will guarantee the dissemination of economic and commercial information and the transmission of the impetus of dynamism necessary for the take off of production and national development.

We are thus working to establish the link between the growers and their market.

Each faritany (province) and each firaisana (district on the next lower level) have their particular economy, their type of production. The management officials on the spot thus are most familiar with the best ways to approach the situation.

#### Economic Independence

We must thus give them the tool they need so that they may submit project drafts on the central level, integrated into the broader development plans, for which we can try to work out financing solutions and certain market outlets. In the light of the number of requests we are getting on this subject, we are convinced of the need for setting up commercial centers in each faritany so as to keep up with the evolution of foreign markets and to respond rapidly, according to our viewpoint and our national decision, to the possibilities of those markets and their demand.

[Question] Will Madagascar have enough aces to get into and possibly prevail within international commercial networks in medium-range and long-range terms?

Leonie Guerra: This in our opinion paradoxically depends on the rate of production, hence, the necessity and effective and efficient orientation of our investments in the matter of production. We can say that Madagascar should not run into any market outlet problems, judging by the requests we are getting in our offices every day. This is true of graphite, chrome, precious and semiprecious or industrial stones, fabrics, sugar, rice, coffee, vanilla, tropical fruits (bananas, litchis, pineapples,

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mangoes, avocados), green or black pepper, meat, sisal, shrimp and other crustaceans, the crafts, to mention just a few. Most of the products are known on the world markets for their quality.

Here is the new orientation in our foreign trade: becoming familiar with modern distribution and marketing methods, I think, is the only way for us to prevail in the international commercial networks.

There is no political independence without economic independence. And the choice in this field has already been spelled out by our president in the Charter of the Malagasy Socialist Revolution, along with our national objectives.

In June 1980 we celebrated the 5th anniversary of the RDM [Democratic Republic of Madagascar]. Every Malagasy citizen and the rest of the world looking upon us, regardless of the political persuasion of each one, had to admit the importance of the road covered over these past several years and the concrete and observable achievements on all points in Madagascar.

Looking at foreign trade, we note a big opening toward new countries while continuing to work with our traditional partners on a worthwhile level. Our trade with the progressive and socialist countries experienced net growth. That applies especially to China, the USSR, Yugoslavia, the GDR, Romania and, in Africa, Algeria, Tanzania, Mozambique, the Seychelles, etc.

With Algeria, in particular, our trade quintupled and continues to grow harmoniously. It should be noted that a few years ago we had practically no trade with the African partners. But our trade also grew in volume and was extended to other countries with a free-enterprise economy, such as Japan, Canada, etc.

Madagascar renewed its old trade agreements, and since 1975, has signed new bilateral agreements with more than 20 countries throughout the world. Through efficient production planning, combined with a marketing technique adapted to our markets and our customers, and through diversification of our exportable products, we think we will be able to guarantee a continuous flow of supplies and a development of our foreign markets and to get into the main stream of international commerce whose requirements are as diverse as they are vast, especially in food. In this way we also are thinking of relieving our economy of dependence on the fluctuation in the rates quoted on major colonial products which still account for 50-60 percent of our export earnings.

But, parallel to that, we are more than ever convinced that we must, nationwide, establish centers for the training of domestic experts, managers, and commercial specialists. A project is now under study along these lines.

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The training of these experts is essential so that our projects may be successful and so that the project proposals being submitted to international and multilateral authorities may contain concrete and precise points and may rapidly lead to reliable and effective implementation.

Specialization is one of the big aces in modern economy. Madagascar must thus have specialists in all fields. As far as we are concerned, that means marketing and management. This is an important requirement when it comes to enabling us to get rid of that old habit which consists in expecting the experts of the industrialized countries to do everything and having confidence only in them.

Through experience we learned often that the funds allocated by multilateral or international organizations to the extent of more than 60 percent go for the fees to be paid to research bureaus and experts. The study reports resulting from this sometimes reveal such platitudes that they are absolutely useless. Nevertheless, their cost would have enabled us to carry out projects and investments which are absolutely vital to publicity for our products. Something which is obvious for the exporting country often is not necessarily so for the research offices or the experts, at the consumer end.

Madagascar has the human resources needed to direct and implement the effort to achieve its objectives successfully. The establishment of these training requirements could only speed up and increase its share in foreign trade.

Here is an example of what I said earlier: in 1979, out of all of the funds granted by Lome for the commercial advancement of the RDM, only 30 percent involved specific investments. And the study behind these investments was conducted by a Malagasy company; the other 60 percent represented payment of fees for experts in research bureaus, as costly as they were useless, because they were unable to adapt their line of reasoning to the realities of the country which was purchasing their services.

One such research bureau tried to diagnose a government agency in just a couple of weeks and to come up with a report on its reorganization along European government agency lines!

Here it is obvious that our interest also is to develop trade between Africans. We say this: "Let us consume Malagasy products and let us buy African whenever that is possible."

In this respect we are also in favor of the creation of a preferential trade zone in eastern and southern Africa--as proposed by the ECA. We believe that this would be a concrete step to permit the effective development of African trade and that this could only strengthen our bilateral actions.

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The International Fair at Algiers, among others; the fairs of Maputo and Dar-es-Salaam as well as the Panafrican Fair which will soon be held for the third time in Khartum, Sudan, constitute an important contribution to the upswing of Malagasy trade and the commerce of each African country.

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MALAWI

## OPERATING BUDGET FOR 1980-1981 FISCAL YEAR REPORTED

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEES in French 20 Jun 80 p 1575

[Text] The Malawi operating budget for the 1980-1981 fiscal year (which we mentioned briefly in our issue of 11 April 1979, p 879) has been set at receipts of 170.3 million kwachas (1 kwacha=approximately 5.2 French francs) and at expenditures of 163.5 million.

The estimated revenues are up 11.3 percent over the sum of resources included in the revised budget for fiscal 1979-1980, with the volume of expenditures increasing by 6.9 percent. Thus, the 1980-1981 budget shows a predicted surplus of 6.8 million kwachas, of which 6 million will be transferred to the development and investment budget.

In two large blocs, the revenue estimates breakdown according to the following table (in millions of kwachas):

	1979-1980 (revised)	1980-1981 (estimated)
Direct taxes and licenses	59.7	62
Customs duties and indirect taxes	81.3	97.6
Receipts from services	2.9	1.8
Revenues from public property	1.9	2.2
Miscellaneous receipts	7.3	6.7
Total	153.1	170.3

Direct taxation should generate 59.2 million kwachas, contributing 34.7 percent of the input to the budget; taxation of business profits represents 60.8 percent of the total of the direct taxes. Customs duties and indirect taxes provide 57.3 percent of the total budget resources.

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Under expenditures, public debt servicing accounts for 32.6 million kwachas, up 22.5 percent in comparison to the 1979-1980 budget. Among the operating credits, the main allocations are for education, 23 million (+15.7 percent); defense, 18.2 million (+3.7 percent); health, 11.7 million (+8.5 percent); agriculture and natural resources development, 10.7 million (+0.6 percent); police and internal security, 10.5 million (-20 percent); public works, 7.5 million (-10.7 percent); rural equipment and irrigation, 7.1 million (+69 percent).

The estimated surplus comes finally to 6.8 million kwachas, while the revised budget for fiscal 1979-1980 provided a surplus of only 0.1 million.

As for the 1980-1981 development budget, its amount is set at 159.1 million kwachas, up 7.7 percent over the revised budget for fiscal 1979-1980. [Translator's note: this increase contradicts the -7.7 percent indicated in the article's heading.] The equipment budget has more than doubled in four years.

Funds for the equipment and investments budget should be ensured by foreign loans in the amount of 86.6 million kwachas (54.4 percent), international cooperation grants for 54 million (33.9 percent), internal borrowing for 10 million (63 percent) [sic; should be 6.3 percent], the transfer of 6 million estimated surplus from the operating budget (3.8 percent), and miscellaneous tax resources for 2.6 million (1.6 percent).

Among the main allocations are transportation, with 60.5 million kwachas (38 percent of the total development budget); construction of administrative buildings, with 26.2 million (16.5 percent); rural agricultural development, with 17.7 million (11.1 percent); energy, with 11.8 million (7.4 percent); water supply and irrigation, with 9.3 million (5.9 percent); education, with 7.9 million (4.9 percent); reforestation (6.1 million); health (5.3 million); veterinary activities in livestock raising development (5.3 million).

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MALAWI

## ECONOMIC PROSPECTS APPEAR GLOOMY AT YEAR'S END

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 15 Aug 80 pp 2010-2011

[Text] At constant prices, Malawi's gross national product is estimated to total 541.2 million kwachas (1 kwacha = approximately 5.2 French francs) for the year 1979, compared with 509.6 million in 1978. Growth therefore rises to 6.2 percent compared with 5.4 percent for the preceding year. Growth was particularly marked in the following branches: energy and water (up 10.8 percent), transport (up 5.6 percent), building-public works (up 6.8 percent), industry (up 6.5 percent) and distribution (up 5.6 percent), while the improvement in agriculture was only 2.8 percent over 1978. In 1979, the primary sector contributed 43 percent of the GNP (down 1 percent), while industrial production totaled 12 percent, the building-public works branch amounted to 6 percent and distribution made up 13 percent.

Prices registered increases of 8 percent throughout the year for basic food products and 14 percent for locally manufactured articles.

Foreign trade: The deficit in the trade balance worsened. The trend in foreign trade since 1977 can be shown as follows (in millions of kwachas):

	1977	1978	1979
Imports CAF	209.8	285.2	328
Exports FOB	172	150.6	184.9
Reexports	8.3	6.9	5.1
Deficit	- 29.5	-127.7	-138

The structure of imports in 1979 is made up of the following: industrial materials (28 percent); oil supply (18 percent); consumer goods (15 percent); capital goods (14 percent); and transportation equipment (13 percent). In the list of suppliers are South Africa (41 percent); the United Kingdom (17 percent); Japan (10 percent); Federal Republic of Germany (5 percent); the United States (3 percent); Zambia (3 percent); the Netherlands (1 percent); and former Rhodesia (1 percent).

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The various national products represented the following percentage of all exports:

	1977	1978	1979
Tobacco	50	59	57
Tea	24	19	17
Sugar	9	8	12
Peanuts	5	3	5
Rice	5	3	5
Cotton	1	1	1
Miscellaneous	10	10	7

In value, tobacco made up 104.5 million kwachas in 1979 (up 17.9 percent), while tea accounted for 30.8 million (up 5.5 percent), sugar made up 22 million (up 100 percent) and peanuts totaled 8.9 million (up 89 percent).

The principal customers are: United Kingdom (45 percent); the Federal Republic of Germany (9 percent), the United States (8 percent), the Netherlands (8 percent), South Africa (4 percent), Zambia (3 percent), Japan (1 percent) and former Rhodesia (1 percent).

Agricultural production: In 1979, marketed tobacco production amounted to 54,000 tons (up 5.7 percent). Tea plantations furnished 32,600 tons (up 2.9 percent). The new Dwanga sugar mill went into service in June 1979 and Malawi's sugar production totaled 108,500 tons for the year (compared with 92,600 tons in 1978), including 66,500 tons which were exported. Sugar production estimates for 1980 are 155,500 tons, including 81,500 tons exported.

The other results of the agricultural season in 1978-1979 yielded 24,400 tons of peanuts (up 119.8 percent), 28,500 tons of paddy rice (down 23.7 percent) and 28,400 tons of cotton seed (down 7.4 percent). The corn harvest suffered unfavorable atmospheric conditions (down 30.4 percent) and the current crop will be even worse.

Among Malawi's exports are small amounts of tropical fish and crocodile hides. With an average annual growth rate of 4.2 percent, livestock totals an estimated 822,700 head.

Industry: Cement production in 1979 amounted to 113,000 tons. A project to build a new cement works at Kasungu with a capacity of 4,000 tons a day is being worked out. There are also projects for glass manufacturing, the production of phosphate fertilizers and future development of coal deposits in the region of Ngana.

Uranium ore prospecting is being done by different international firms and the British trust Lonrho is doing strontianite prospecting at Kangakunde and Machinga.

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Transport: In November 1979, the Air Malawi fleet received another plane. Passenger traffic went up 6.5 percent at the Chiteke airport and 29.4 percent at Lilongwe.

The new railroad line between Salima and Lilongwe went into service in February 1979 and passenger traffic went up 3.9 percent.

At the end of 1979, the industrial production index was 227.5 compared with 220.5 a year previously. The particular index of industries based on exports amounted to 218.4 compared with 217.1 at the end of 1978.

Tourism: In 1979, Malawi welcomed 37,700 visitors (tourism and business). Accommodations will be substantially increased with the construction of new hotels and the expansion of several existing establishments.

Employment: Regarding employment, the number of wage-earning employees in business with over 20 workers rose to 369,100 at the end of 1979, up 8.9 percent in one year. The agricultural sector provides 50 percent of all jobs.

Finances: Independently of the Reserve Bank, Malawi's financial system includes postal savings banks, the New Building Society, Mercantile Credit Limited and Indebank.

At the end of 1979, money in circulation represented 77.6 million kwachas (up 3.5 percent over 1978). Deposits in commercial banks on 31 December 1979 totaled 106.9 million kwachas for the private sector (up 3.5 million) and 294 million for the public sector (down 4 million).

Total credits amounted to 226.5 million kwachas compared with 186.2 million a year previously. The strong demand for loans caused banks to increase their foreign debt (up 71.8 percent) and their debt to the reserve bank (up 195 percent).

The volume of credit granted to the government by the Reserve Bank increased 155 percent in 1979. The Treasury had to issue six domestic loans. At the end of 1979, Malawi's foreign exchange reserves represented the exchange value of 57.1 million kwachas, down some 11 percent.

For 1979, the balance of payments showed a surplus of 3.8 million kwachas (compared with a surplus of 15.3 million in 1978), considering the net contribution of 81.7 million kwachas in foreign aid.

The public debt rose from 292 to 382.8 million kwachas at the end of 1979 (up 31 percent). Commitments were mainly made to the United Kingdom (49.2 million), South Africa (17.6 million), the United States (24.5 million), Denmark (5.9 million), Japan (4.4 million), international financial organizations for development: International Development Association, African Development Bank, the European Development Fund (143 million), commercial credits for 34.3 million and foreign bank loans for 99.7 million.

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In 1979, service on the debt absorbed 25.9 million kwachas (up 40.3 percent), including 17.1 million in interest and 8.8 million in amortization annuities. This burden represented 11.77 percent of proceeds from exports, compared with 9.85 percent in 1978.

From 1964 to 1979, the gross national product rose at an average annual rate of 13.8 percent at current prices, or 6.7 percent at constant prices. Real per capita income increased over the same period from an average of 3.8 percent yearly. Gross domestic savings rose regularly: from .5 percent of the gross national product in 1964 to 13.5 percent in 1979.

Growth in investment expenditures brought about an increase in imports from an average of 16.5 percent annually from 1964 to 1979 (essentially in capital goods and building materials). The increase in exports was slower than import growth by an average of 2 percent annually, essentially due to the deterioration in the terms of trade.

Malawi's economic situation will continue to depend on the climatic conditions which affect its agricultural production and international prices for its main exports: tobacco, tea, sugar, peanuts, rice and cotton. After the reopening of the border with Zimbabwe, the structure of Malawi's imports will most likely be modified, since Zimbabwe will be able to take South Africa's place in supplying certain products. At the same time, the resumption of Zimbabwe's tobacco exports may upset the Malawi economy because tobacco represents 60 percent of all exports.

The growth in the public debt and its service, the foreign debt and the debt to the Reserve Bank, the strong growth in domestic credit and the drop in foreign exchange reserves are combining to create a very tight situation for financial management with Treasury problems.

As a result, economic predictions for 1980 correspond to zero growth. Nevertheless, over the next 5 years, beginning in 1981, public officials expect a return to the average annual level of growth registered since 1970, or 6.7 percent.

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MALI

BRIEFS

JAPANESE TRANSPORTATION ASSISTANCE--Japan has given Mali a 500-million yen grant to improve the Malian transportation system according to the terms of an agreement signed in Dakar at the end of August between Sono Uchida, Japanese ambassador to Senegal also accredited to Mali and Malian ambassador Mamadou Diawara. The Japanese diplomat noted that Japan had provided Mali with three grants since 1978, all aimed at the transportation sector and amounting to 1.3 billion yen. This Japanese assistance has made it possible for Mali to purchase 88 trucks as well as a significant number of spare parts. Mali and Japan are also cooperating in the fields of mineral exploration, hydraulics and agriculture. [Excerpt] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 5 Sep 80 p 2188]

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MOZAMBIQUE

REPORT ON SIXTH SESSION OF PEOPLE'S ASSEMBLY

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 8 Aug 80 p 1990

[Report: "Sixth Session of the People's Assembly"]

[Text] One of the major targets of the Mozambique government, stemming from the independence, was political control over a population which, following the end of the colonial system, on 25 June 1975, was not very familiar with FRELIMO and, in any case, was not ready to be governed by it. The government succeeded with the help of successive "national campaigns" which led to the transformation of the front into a Marxist-Leninist political party, its structuring, and the 1977 "elections" which lasted 3 months and amounted to hardly more than the approval by acclamation of the lists of candidates drawn up by the party in the course of people's meetings.

It is thus that Mozambique has acquired a pyramid of "assemblies" elected by voice vote: 900 local assemblies totaling 20,000 representatives; some 100 district assemblies; about 10 provincial assemblies; and, finally, a People's Assembly, the supreme state authority, in charge of providing guidelines but without the power to vote on the budget or pass draft laws (which is the duty of a permanent commission consisting of 14 members whose legislative program must be approved as a unit twice annually).

This rather strange organization, this "parliament unlike other parliaments," as recently described by AFP, are actuated by President Machel who, as a supporter of the permanent revolution, intends to contribute to the "enrichment of Marxism-Leninism" which he is turning, through his activities, into "Samorian Marxism." The chief of state wants firsthand information on the situation in the country. Hence the many surprise visits he has paid in recent months to the ports, plants, and administrations personally to check on the operation.

This direct contact with reality, which has always been manifested by encouraging the people's criticism and, occasionally, the dismissal of incompetent officials, has coincided with the start of the "decade of victory over underdevelopment," for that is how the 1980-1990 period has been labeled.

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The current "political-organizational offensive" implies the strengthening of the only party. To this effect, last April two of the highest leaders of the system, Marcelino dos Santos and Jorge Rebelo, were relieved of their governmental duties to dedicate themselves, within the FRELIMO Central Committee, respectively, to economic planning and ideological tasks.

This glance at the recent past is useful, considering the 8-day closed session, held end July, by the Sixth Session of the People's Assembly, in the course of which, symbolically meeting in the former Portuguese Military Club in Maputo, the 191 deputies of all ethnic groups and population strata discussed the current problems.

To help them in their debates, they had invited some 100 outside experts: high officials and intellectuals, but clerical as well, including the Catholic Vicar General of Maputo, and a member of the Islamic community. These experts had contributed "their personal experience and view of the problems." Since some workers and peasants representatives sitting in the People's Assembly can hardly read and write, President Machel would like the assembly to also be a "school for cadres."

Without questioning the basic options of the system, those who participated in the Sixth Session of the assembly voiced a number of criticisms dealing with some aspects of Mozambican life such as, for example, the excessive strictness of security officials in the various regions.

The session closed on 25 July with a 90-minute speech by President Machel who reminded the representatives that they are in charge of "mobilizing the people against enemies" inside the country ('agents of capitalism in enterprises, hospitals, ports. . .') and on the outside ('South Africa, a bastion of imperialism in our area,' symbolizing the confrontation between capitalism and socialism).

The chief of state equally urged the representatives to organize the growth of agricultural output "to put an end to hunger" at a time when the country is experiencing some food shortages. He emphasized that, bearing in mind the independence gained by Zimbabwe, Mozambique would be able to dedicate itself more to its economic development with, for the first time, a substantial aid of Western countries such as France.

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MOZAMBIQUE

BRIEFS

POWER STATION EXPANSION--Mozambique has announced its intention to develop the hydroelectric power plant of Cabora Bassa (built in 1967 with the help, among others, of French, West German, and South African capital), serving South Africa in addition to the Mozambican provinces. The expansion of the plant will include the building of an underground power plant, the strengthening of power-carrying systems to South Africa, and the building of 22 power transformer substations. The current complex is assessed at 21 million meticaïs (\$65 million). Its five generators, operating since 1977, have a generating capacity of 425 megawatts each. The implementation of the project will raise the overall energy output of the plant to 4,000 megawatts. This will make it the fourth biggest in the world and the biggest on the African continent. Currently the complex is administered by the Hidroelectrica de Cabora Bassa, whose capital is essentially Portuguese. In accordance with the agreements between Portugal and Mozambique the shares will be gradually transferred to Mozambique with full payment to be completed by the year 2005. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 8 Aug 80 p 1990] 5157

FOOD INDUSTRY NATIONALIZATION--The Mozambican government has announced the nationalization of its biggest food industry enterprise, the Companhia Industrial da Matola, whose Portuguese management is currently abroad. According to a communique issued by the Ministry of Industry and Energy, the six production units located in the vicinity of Maputo will no longer belong to the Portuguese company owners. The company will specialize in the production of foodstuffs based on cereals. The decision was taken as a result of the "grave situation" of the enterprise, which has resulted in a drop in production. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 8 Aug 80 p 1990] 5157

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NIGER

BCEAO BULLETIN NOTES 1979-1980 ECONOMIC SITUATION

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 25 Jul 80  
p 1857

Text BCEAO Central Bank of the West African States devoted one of its recent bulletins of economic and monetary statistics to Niger.

The main marketed agricultural products of the 1978-79 harvest amounted to 8,888 t of shelled peanuts (-5,700 t compared with the preceding harvest), 4,371 t of seed cotton (+572 t) and 79,000 t of food products (millet, sorghum and string beans). At the beginning of the 1979-1980 harvest, the sales price of gum arabic (151 t gathered in 1979) increased from 175 to 180 CFA francs a kilogram.

On 20 February 1980, purchases of peanuts from the 1979-1980 crop amounted to 2,013 tons and at the end of January 1980, deliveries of seeds to oil works were about 140 t.

Production of uranium ore in 1979 was estimated at 3,540 t (+1,431 t compared with 1978); exports brought in 834 billion CFA francs (+31 billion).

During 1979, the joint Benin-Niger Railroad and Transport Company transported 90,700 tons of fuel to Niger.

During the first 11 months of 1979, the Niamey International Airport recorded 5,360 commercial plane flights and 116,000 passengers arriving and departing; cargo traffic amounted to 13,700 t, of which 85 percent was on arrival.

The merchandise turnover index of the main commercial companies at the end of October 1979 was 369.7 compared with 288.7 a year before (base 100 for 1979). At the end of February 1980, the

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general index of African family consumer prices stood at 264.1 compared with 253.1 at the end of February 1979 (base 100 for 1970).

The budget of the 1980 fiscal year (1 October 1979 to 30 September 1980) in receipts and expenditures was set at 72.1 billion CFA (+12.8 billion compared with the preceding year); with equipment credits being recorded at 26 billion CFA (+4.1 billion).

At the end of 1978, the total Niger foreign debt represented the exchange value of 42.5 billion CFA (+14.7 billion increase in a year), the available margin on credits obtained was estimated at the counterpart of 42.7 billion CFA (+8.7 billion compared with the end of 1977). In 1978, debt service absorbed 2.4 billion CFA in amortization and interest.

On 31 January 1980, bills and currency in circulation totaled 30.7 billion CFA (+8.4 billion in a year). At the end of 1979, sight and term deposits in banks were estimated at 36.3 billion CFA (+3.6 billion compared with the end of 1978). On the other hand, credits to the economy were 75.8 billion CFA, an increase of 21.6 billion compared with the end of December 1978.

Likewise on 31 December 1978, the net credit position of the Niger Treasury was 18.4 billion CFA (+6.5 billion compared with 1978).

Net foreign assets of the central bank were 22.4 billion CFA at the end of 1979 (-1 billion compared with the end of 1978).

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NIGER

FRUIT, VEGETABLE EXPORTS 1979-1980

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 15 Aug 80 p 2029

[Text] The Nigerian wholesalers company (Soniprim) provisions for the 1979-1980 export campaign were 425t of green beans and 65t of melons, for a total net weight of 490t.

The production campaign was progressing under good conditions, at least until the arrival of the heat wave at the end of March affected the bean harvest both in the fields--plant height--and those harvested. Although deliveries were suspended around 10 April, the forecasts were pretty well realized since 516t (gross weight) of green beans were delivered during the campaign.

As for the melons, export forecasts were not reached because there was little demand in Europe in March and April due to the cold and rainy weather. Because of this, the hundreds of tons of Charenton melons produced by the Soniprim were sold on the local market. When a sunnier period arrived in Europe around the end of April, Niger's full production had already ended. One understands why then, that of 65t estimated, only 5t of melons were exported.

Thus the total of Soniprim's fruit and vegetable exports for 1979-1980 was 521t.

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NIGERIA

BRIEFS

FEDERAL MONEY DISTRIBUTION--The Federal Nigerian Government published on 1 September a white paper on the distribution among the states of the receipts of the federation of which 85 percent comes from oil. This white paper contains the conclusions of a commission of inquiry which was appointed to examine how well-founded certain criticisms were on the former distribution and to formulate new proposals. The five states controlled by the minority party, the United Party of Nigeria (UPN), will probably reject the commission's proposals out of hand. According to the white paper, however, the proposals concern the following division of the receipts: 55 percent for federal government, 30 percent for the states, and 8 percent for the local governments within the states. The remaining 7 percent is to be placed in a special fund which is to be used, among other things, to provide compensation to the oil-producing states. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEES in French 5 Sep 80 p 2194]

NO PRIVATE SCHOOL SUPPRESSION--The decision of the Nigerian Government to suppress all private primary schools in Nigeria was declared illegal and unconstitutional by a judge of the court of appeals in Lagos. It will be recalled that the governor of the state of Lagos, Alhaji Lateef Jakande, championed this suppression. [Excerpt] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEES in French 5 Sep 80 p 2194]

RESEARCH INSTITUTES COUNCILS DISSOLVED--Radio Lagos announced on 16 August that the government had proceeded to dissolve the administrative councils of 22 national research institutes as of 28 July. The news broadcast by the radio was confirmed a few days later by the federal Ministry of Science and Technology. Among the institutes involved are: the Cocoa Research Institute of Nigeria, the Nigerian Institute for Oil Palm Research, the Rubber Research Institute of Nigeria, and the National Cereals Research Institute. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEES in French 5 Sep 80 p 2194]

LOCAL RADIO IN ABUJA--The director general of the Federal Radio Corporation, Mr George Bako, announced that in October of this year radio broadcasting will begin in the future federal capital. Radio Abuja



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will broadcast on medium wave and will be especially in the beginning the spokesman of the Federal Capital Development Authority for the reinstallation of displaced persons. Mr Bako was congratulated for the work already accomplished on the air of the future capital and stated that in fact everything seemed to be ready to welcome the headquarters of various national organizations as well as most of the ministries. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEES in French 5 Sep 80 p 2194]

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SENEGAL

PDS SAID TO BE FORCE TO BE RECKONED WITH

Paris AFRIQUE-ASIE in French 4-17 Aug 80 pp 32-35

[Article by Ginette Cot: "The PDS--From Face-to-Face to Hand-to-Hand Confrontation"]

[Text] "For more than 20 years, the UPS [Senegalese Progressive Union]-PS [Socialist Party] regime has succeeded in entirely muzzling the citizens. All attempts at challenge were immediately nipped in the bud. Those who struggled (the militants of the PAI [African Independence Party], among others, know something about this) were immediately arrested, put into prison or exiled. To such an extent that we appear to be condemned to live eternally under an absolute monarchy, and that no one any longer believed in the possibility that a legal opposition party could exist in Senegal." For this early militant in the PDS in Saint-Louis, the legal establishment of Mr Abdoulaye Wade's party in July of 1974 "came like a flash of lightning in the midst of a drought." Put in another way, a hope was born which could not be allowed to slip away. "I myself, like others, said that it was impossible to await developments passively. Even if we could achieve nothing, it was necessary to try to do something."

When one questions the base-level militants of the PDS as to the reasons for their support of and confidence in Mr Wade's party, whether it be in the villages of Diourbel, Sine-Saloum or Casamance, in Saint-Louis, Louga, Thies or Kaolack, the answers hardly vary. "The present regime is leading the country toward bankruptcy," they explain. "It has kept none of its promises. The situation is catastrophic and the people are being stripped of the little they have. A change, a change from every point of view, is needed to save the country."

This aspiration for change, which is widespread and which the PDS has made its battlehorse ("sopi" means change in Wolof) is, as is known, the main slogan of the party, and along with the legal status which Mr Wade's movement enjoys, at least officially--these are without question the two major trumps of the Senegalese Democratic Party. "We ask aid of those who can help us get rid of this regime," the mother of a family comments.

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Now for her as for the majority of the members of the PDS, "only Wade's party has dared to try and been able to break free of the yoke. For the 'others,' earlier, immediately got themselves arrested."

But it is also thanks to its practice of "going to the masses" and talking to them specifically about the problems in their daily lives that the PDS speedily succeeded in winning ground, in particular along the rural population. Moreover, in the Senegalese villages, the PDS militants point out: "Who to date has shown concern for us? Has President Senghor ever come to see first-hand how we live? He is always abroad, he concerns himself with entirely different things. Wade, for his part, has come." And it is often in connection with a visit from the PDS leader that the lever is tripped, and massive enrollment results.

"Until now--and the leaders of the UPS-PS have provided evidence of it--engaging in politics (legal politics is meant) has been a means of getting rich," the PDS militants still believe. "Abdoulaye Wade's move is in the other direction. Materially, he was provided for, and he already enjoyed widespread fame both in Senegal and Africa. Thus for himself he had no need to enter the political arena. If he did so it was out of conviction, in a concern for serving the country."

Some of those who have joined the PDS had never been active before since "it was of no interest to them to work in a single party of the dictatorial type." Others, increasingly numerous, have come from the party in power, whole sections of which are in the process of crumbling (a PS leader who resigns generally takes with him in his "transfer" all of the members in his district or faction). Doubtless these conversions are not entirely free in all cases of afterthought. Within the context of the extremely acute internal struggles in which the "barons" of the regime engage on all levels, "going over" to the PDS might sometimes be a means of blackmail in an effort to win back a lost post. And in the general atmosphere of "every man for himself" which currently prevails within the regime in power, it is doubtless just as well also to think of the future. However, one should make no mistake. It is the same yearning for change, the same disillusionment after 20 years of failure and diverted or unkept promises which generally leads people from the PS to join the PDS.

#### Financial Bankruptcy

"The party in power is in full rout. It is responsible for the corruption which prevails in the country and the financial bankruptcy of the state," explains a woman in Kaolack who has been a militant in the UPS-PS for more than 30 years, where she was a women's sector official. She has now become the leader of the PDS women's organization in the capital of the Sine-Saloum region. "I will soon be 70, and if I have taken up political activity again in joining the PDS, it is so that my children will have a different life." For the veterans of the UPS-PS who have joined Mr Wade's party, the attitude is the same. "We worked with 'them' night and day, and we got

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nothing. They treated us like sheep, like slaves. This is why we want to wage the struggle with the PDS today," the militants in Ndiakathe, in the Thies region, explain, while others elsewhere emphasize: "When there was only one legal party, we did not know where to go. But with the PDS, hope has returned, and we have reacquired a taste for combat."

However, the first years, in which survival seemed a veritable long shot, were not easy for the PDS. Accused by almost the whole of the leftist opposition of playing the game of the regime, which by venturing a limited and controlled democratic liberalization hoped to gain second wind and erect a dam to contain the discontent threatening to flood it, the PDS hardly seems to have been taken seriously by the "barons" of the regime.

"Until 1976, they laughed at us," the militants who were with the PDS in its first hesitant years recall. "Our party's merit is that it resisted winds from all quarters and instead of remaining confined to the cities, among the intellectuals, it went to the rural masses. We have learned much from this contact. This has allowed us to establish very firm foundations and to frustrate the calculations of the governmental party, which hoped to have only a tailor-made, non-threatening opposition. It was in 1976, at the time of the first constitutional congress in Kaolack, that the regime realized it had made a mistake. Everything was done then--including public instructions issued for the purpose--to attempt to dismantle the PDS in Sine-Saloum.

"Major repressive forces were mobilized to intimidate us. It was thanks to the enormous effort put forth that we were able to hold our congress in a tent put up on the property of one of our members--the use of the moving-picture theater having been denied us--and it was following these sessions that we truly believed in our own forces. Our members went back to their respective sectors, confident and much more combative. We were able to face up to the regime. Now it is the period of hand-to-hand struggle."

Despite the frustration caused by the electoral fraud--of which detailed and convincing proof is available everywhere--and which was the sole reason in February 1978 that the PS was able to remain in power, despite the doubts which followed the balloting, was it wise to go into the streets or not? Should the PDS parliamentary group, which had won 20 percent of the votes, boycott the assembly to test these falsified results or not? And since that time, the PDS has not ceased to advance. At the time of its creation in July 1974, it had seven members, several of whom have since resigned. In December 1975 it had 126,000, in February 1976, at the time of the Kaolack congress, it had 350,000, and in November 1977, at the time of second congress held in Dakar to nominate the candidates for the legislative and presidential elections, it had 600,000. It is said to have nearly 800,000 members at present.

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In any case, the PDS has emerged today as a force which everyone must take into account. The third congress, with the assigned theme of "orientation," held in the El Mansour cinema in Dakar on 16, 17 and 18 May last, fully confirmed this. Sixteen hundred delegates representing 32 federations in the 3 regions of the country paid their own way to participate in its work, which bore witness both to the truly popular nature of the base levels of the PDS and the general and profound sense of being "fed up" prevailing in the country.

For 3 days, in fact, the delegates, ordinary people in the vast majority, discussed the daily problems with which they are faced, from the increasing deterioration in their regions, their villages, the poverty of the rural masses, the exodus from the countryside, the petty annoyances and "organized theft" of which the victims include small businessmen, craftsmen, peasants and even the women who, given the unemployment which plagues their husbands, engage in some small unimportant businesses to guarantee the survival of their families (such as the sale of smoked fish), but who find themselves stripped of their meager earnings by taxes and unjust fines. Administrative abuses have in fact been denounced with specific examples in support of the charges. For example, there was even a case in which a sub-prefect in Diakhao confiscated pots of food confiscating on the stove on the pretext of forcing the peasants to settle their debts.

By contrast, the insolent luxury in which the profiteers of the regime live, the embezzlements one after the other, such as those from communal budgets, and the administrative corruption are intolerable. Taken together, these make up a violent and detailed indictment of the regime in power drafted by people who feel in their flesh the misdeeds of the regime. A sign of the times--and it is not in fact such a rare occurrence--could be seen in the inscription at the PDS congress of a former political official of the PS from the department of Bakel, Amadou Deme, who brought with him 5,800 former members of the Socialist Party. "Just a few days ago, we were members of the PS, which we built with our own hands," Amadou Deme, a member for 25 years of the government party, from the age of 16, said from the rostrum at the congress. "But the situation in the country has led us to search our consciences. The PS has betrayed the peasants, the Moslems, all the men and women of this country," he said in substance, and then went on to denounce the squandering of the national wealth and the lack of cadres and financial management, and committed himself to work with the PDS for the reconstruction of the country.

The speeches at the May congress amply demonstrated that the members of the PDS are determined to carry their battle for change through to the end. And it is clear that the opinion of the base level has indeed felt the effects of this work. It is true, as the founder of the party has reiterated recently, there is no question of "rallying power in the streets," and the PDS has thus far adhered resolutely to its electoral and legal strategy.

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### The Principles

"We have pursued a certain type of opposition action which some fail to appreciate," Mr Wade (who was reelected to his post as secretary general) stressed at the conclusion of the congress. "Our actions are based on a certain number of principles. And the congress fully confirmed the orientation the PDS has adopted for itself."

However, the May sessions forcefully posed the problem of the legitimacy and alternation of the party in power. "Government is in the hands in our country today of a political party--the PS, which is old and worn and in the grip of irresistible internal contradictions, and which in addition, because of the policy of waste, corruption, misappropriation and underhanded dealings it has pursued since Senegal won international sovereignty, has led the country to the brink of the abyss and in so doing has entirely lost the confidence of the masses. The legitimacy this party enjoys in law has become therefore in fact a usurpation," the general policy statement approved by the third congress stresses. It also "solemnly demands the dissolution of the national assembly, which it no longer regards as representative today of the popular will, and the organization of free, honest, sincere and democratic elections."

For in the view of the PDS, the "structural changes demanded by the economic and financial crisis the country is experiencing . . . can only be effected by political forces whose legitimacy is not in doubt, and this legitimacy, in order to be a source of authority, can only come from the polls."

Indeed, the PDS is open about its claims. It asserts that thanks to the "implementation even in the most distant village of its realistic program, consistent with the deep aspirations of the masses, the lucidity of its choices, the realism of its actions, its devotion to the cause of the weak and neglected, to the African and international audience which it has been able to win in less than 6 years of existence," it is "in fact the sole bearer of popular legitimacy!"

But it cannot ignore the rest of the Senegalese opposition either, which the PDS members sometimes tend to link somewhat hastily with "agitation by parlor revolutionaries," but which, despite its division, remains extremely active and is pursuing major struggles in the field. "The Senegalese opposition, strong too in the existence of two other legal parties, the PAI and the MRS [Extreme Right Wing Party], and an increasing number of small and other political groups, finds itself objectively in a position to rescue Senegal from the crisis in which the PS, the party in power, has plunged it," says the general policy statement approved by the congress. And, in the thinking of the PDS, all the opposition parties and groups, both legal and unrecognized, should participate in the general elections it is demanding.

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But despite certain incipient discussions--between the legal PAI and the PDS, for example, between the PDS Union of Labor Youth and the Albory N'Diaye Union of Democratic Youth (the youth organization of the PAI in Senegal), which are signatories of a joint declaration, it goes without saying that the disputes dividing the party of Mr Wade from the opposition which regards itself as farther to the left has remained to date intact.

Finally, how can the regime be forced to accept a challenge of it by agreeing to early elections? "No hypothesis, even the definitive withdrawal of our parliamentary group from the national assembly, can be excluded," was Mr Wade's answer at the conclusion of the third congress of his party. This decision, which is very important and cannot fail to worry the regime to the extent that it challenges the plans for succession envisaged by Senghor and endorsed by a constitutional reform (Article 35), "is not an open card in a poker game," the assistant secretary general of the PDS, Farah Ndiaye, said for his part. "It reflects the profound and general conviction that to save Senegal today, it is absolutely necessary that the popular will be allowed to express itself again." Mr Wade further solemnly stated at the conclusion of the third congress that "the PDS will not allow any force whatsoever to seize power in Senegal on the basis of provisions of a monarchic type imposed on the nation."

Similarly, the whole of the PDS from the base to the summit proclaims that the regime can no longer be allowed to manipulate or falsify elections. The third congress moreover rose to its feet to swear "an oath that only the truth will emerge at the polls." "We will fight if necessary. We will take up arms as other peoples have done if necessary," the militants of the PDS say. "But we will not let further advantage be taken of us."

#### Charges Against Mr Wade

In reality, there seems to be every indication that the era of "face-to-face" confrontation and minor concessions is well and truly in the past.

Panicky and on the verge of bankruptcy, the PS government is less and less capable of playing the game of limited democracy. The boycotting of the PDS congress by the mass media in Senegal--it took intervention on a high level to get a clear report published in LE SOLEIL and a summary carried on television, the petty harassment and discrimination to which PDS members are increasingly subjected, the seizures of foreign newspapers and the suits filed at the drop of a hat against Senegalese opposition journalists, etc, had already demonstrated this. The charges recently made on a false pretext against Mr Abdoulaye Wade, to the effect that he "circulated false reports of a nature such as to threaten the institutions and the morale of the people," could well be an indirect response by the regime to the recent undertakings by the PDS which quite obviously herald a hardening in the struggle. Following the demand of the third congress for early elections, the PDS gave its public support to the Single Democratic Union of Teachers in Senegal (SUDES), which has been at odds

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with the government for several months. Finally, on 4 June, the PDS deputies decided to boycott the budget session in order to protest the refusal of the prime minister and those who praise him to agree to a true debate in the national assembly. "We refuse to remain any longer the powerless witnesses to a policy drafted by others, a policy with which we do not agree. We refuse to remain any longer the hostages of a system we condemn," Mr Wade stated when he announced the temporary withdrawal of the PDS group from the budget session.

The "barons" of the regime responded to the challenge thrown down by the PDS with repression, thus showing that they are ready to do anything to remain in power and that they will spare no opposition, legal though it be. Thus a true race seems to have begun in Senegal, wherein the maneuvering room of each participant is likely to shrink like leather. In view of the dangers threatening the country, the Senegalese opposition will not at best be strong enough. For that matter, the moment is less than ever indicative of blame, requiring instead agreement with a view to a minimal program of action with clearly defined goals. But is this possible?

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SENEGAL

PDS STRUCTURES REORGANIZATION DISCUSSED

Paris AFRIQUE-ASIE in French 4-17 Aug 80 p 34

[Text] The strengthening of the PDS [Senegalese Democratic Party] was reflected during the third congress in May in structural reforms which, according to its leaders, should make possible greater participation by the base membership and decentralization of responsibility. For example, a new intermediary body, the national committee, was created, to function in between the national executive secretariat, or leadership committee (executive body) and the Political Bureau. With a membership including, among others, delegates elected by each departmental federation --three or four members per federation depending on the number of membership cards issued, the Political Bureau, the highest organ between congresses, has the responsibility for defining party policy on the basis of the directives of the congress and of supervising the activities of the executive secretariat and the internal bodies.

But it was explained, the Political Bureau, a very heavy body, could not meet regularly because among other things of travel difficulties and party financial means. Thus it will in the future meet only every quarter. In the meantime, the national committee, the members of which in addition to the executive secretary include all the federal secretaries, will meet every month. A more flexible structure which can function more readily, the national committee should make more systematic distribution of information from the summit to the base, and vice versa, possible.

Finally, the national executive secretariat was expanded from 12 to 25 members, now including a number of new members including 1 woman, and young people. This body, in which only the national general secretary is elected by the congress, represents the real "staff" of the party leader. Its other members, the list of whom was submitted to the congress for its evaluation, are chosen by the secretary general, who can dismiss any member at any time in case of default or incompetence. Each national secretary is responsible for one department and recruits his coworkers. The coordination, conception and supervision are carried out on the level of the deputy national secretary, and also, naturally, that of the secretary general.

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This organization is designed to achieve a double goal: to make the party research and political work more profound in all sectors (education, economy, social affairs, African and foreign policy, etc) and to establish work files and documents to facilitate the definition of the guidelines and policy of the party in all sectors and at all times. "At the beginning, the regime succeeded in winning some of our officials away from us, and we had to establish a veritable war cabinet," Mr Wade stressed in commenting on the expansion of the national secretariat. "In the future, it will no longer be capable of corrupting our people. This new situation thus has allowed us to decentralize and expand responsibilities."

Similarly, this new situation has made possible the democratization of the party on the regional and departmental levels, where the responsible bodies on all levels (regional conventions and federations, in particular) will in the future be elected by the base level.

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SENEGAL

BICIS OPERATIONS FISCAL YEAR 1978-1979

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 15 Aug 80 p 2026

[Report: "The BICIS 1978-1979 Budget"]

[Text] Within the framework of a decline of the Senegalese economy, the Senegal International Commerce and Industry Bank (BICIS) maintained in the course of its 1978-1979 fiscal year a position which developed favorably in terms of employment while the situation with deposits was slightly weakened.

The balance on 30 September 1979 was 41.3 billion CFA. Overall deposits rose from 22.3 billion CFA at the end of September 1978 to 26.7 billion at the end of September 1979, or an increase of 19.8 percent.

Loans to the economy rose from 21.3 billion to 27.1 billion CFA or a 27.3 percent growth for the fiscal year; most of the credits granted were, above all, to the priority sectors (agriculture, fishing, industry, public housing and repurchasing of enterprises by country nationals).

Nonbalance guarantees and endorsements totaled 10.9 billion CFA (+40 percent). Credits granted to customers totaled 2 billion CFA, showing a relative stability.

The operational account showed a substantial increase in personnel expenditures (+21 percent) and in the cost of resources and the treasury (+37 percent).

Subtracting amortizations and reserves (515 million CFA), the 1978-1979 fiscal year shows a net profit of 356 million CFA as against 424 million in the previous fiscal year. The 11 March 1980 general meeting decided to issue a 12.5 percent dividend on a capital of 1.2 billion CFA and a combined capital of 1.5 billion in reserves and allowances. The same day, a general meeting voted in favor of raising capitalization from 1.2 billion to 3 billion CFA.

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The BICIS is a branch of the Overseas Finance Company consisting of the following groups: Bank of America, Banque Bruxelles Lambert, Banque nationale de Paris and Dresdner Bank. Cheikhou Faye is the president of the BICIS while its director general is Babacar Ndoeye.

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SENEGAL

BRIEFS

FRUIT, VEGETABLE EXPORTS--Anticipated exports by Asepas of mixed fruits and vegetables totaled 5,625 tons for the 1979-1980 crop. Bearing in mind the gradual recovery of output in the areas managed by the former Bud Senegal, total Senegalese exports were anticipated at 6,000 tons. Even though the Cole-ACP does not have as yet the final figures on Senegal's export season, the indication of the amount of fruits and vegetables hauled by Air Afrique, totaling 2,430 tons from January to May, and by Air France, of about 1,100 tons from January to June, and by various foreign companies, totaling close to 450 tons, provides an initial idea of the size of the crop which would be in the vicinity of 4,000 tons. Considering that no real resumption of exports based on the former areas managed by Bud (other than some 50 tons of vegetables), the 4,000 tons carried by the various airlines unquestionably come from the Asepas which means that under these conditions it would have reached slightly over 70 percent of its export expectations. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 15 Aug 80 p 2026] 5157

REFORESTATION CAMPAIGN STARTS--The reforestation campaign which involves the planting of 3 million trees on 30,000 hectares was opened on 9 August in Joal by Abdou Diouf, the Senegalese prime minister. The struggle against desertification in Senegal is a governmental priority, for at the current pace of destruction of forests by people and by the drought, by the year 2000 no forests would be left in Senegal. The target of the Senegalese government is the reforestation of 10,000 hectares annually. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 15 Aug 80 p 2026] 5157

AID TO RURAL AREAS--The food situation and the condition of the herds were discussed on 1 August by an interministerial council attended by ministers interested in such matters and the governors of the eight Senegalese regions, shared by Abdou Diouf, the Senegalese prime minister. Following the report submitted by the minister of rural development and the governors, the prime minister decided that greater aid will be provided to the rural areas. He also emphasized the need for national solidarity. A permanent work group was set up to supervise the implementation of adopted measures. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 15 Aug 80 p 2026] 5157

JAPANESE GIFT--Japan has made a gift to Senegal of audio-visual materials worth 40 billion CFA. Such goods, to be used for the promotion of literacy, were delivered on 8 August to Kader Fall, the Senegalese

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minister of education, by Japanese ambassador to Dakar Sonoo Uchida. Furthermore, Fall indicated that Senegal and Japan were negotiating the establishment of an electronic vocational training center. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 15 Aug 80 p 2026] 5157

FRENCH BUDGETARY AID--On 31 July France and Senegal signed in Paris a budgetary aid agreement for a total of 28.2 million francs which will lower interest rates on a loan of 80 million francs granted for a term of 15 years, with a 5-year grace period, provided by the Central Economic Cooperation Bank (CCCE). The purpose of the loan is to boost the Senegalese economy hindered by very substantial credit restrictions affecting the recently adopted recovery plan. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 15 Aug 80 p 2027] 5157

IRAQI TRADE MISSION--An Iraqi economic mission, headed by Faysal Gaylani, director of the State Company for the Marketing of Food Products, began its visit to Dakar on 30 July. The mission studied the means for the development of cooperation and trade with Senegal and, specifically, the question of goods which could be traded and the difficulties stemming from the lack of direct sea links between the two countries. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 15 Aug 80 p 2027] 5157

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TANZANIA

BRIEFS

TWICO WOOD MONOPOLY--The Tanzania Wood Industry Corporation (TWICO) could acquire exclusive exploitation rights of Tanzania's forests. This was announced last July by the minister for natural resources and animal production, at the TWICO general meeting. He suggested that the meeting issue a recommendation in this sense. Should the TWICO obtain exclusive rights, private forestry entrepreneurs will have to negotiate with it, on a commercial basis, to meet their requirements. So far they negotiated directly with the forestry division of the ministry. Currently TWICO controls between 40 and 50 percent of the forestry exploitation in the country. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 15 Aug 80 p 2039] 5157

JAPANESE CONSTRUCTING NEW PORT--The Tanzanian minister for works has approved a contract for 5 million Tanzanian shillings with the Nippon Koei Japanese company which will supervise the building of the new Selander Bridge in Dar-es-Salaam. Furthermore, 10 Japanese enterprises have been selected to submit bids for the work. The bids must be tendered before the end of August. The Tanzanian public works officials will visit Japan at the beginning of September to examine the bids and sign the work contract. The winner must be ready to begin in November and complete the project in 18 months, or March-April 1982. The project, financed with a Japanese loan of 1.5 billion yen (60 million Tanzanian shillings) will include the building of a four-lane bridge and access ways, with bicycle and pedestrian lanes. The new bridge, which will connect the Ocean and Upange roads with the Kinongoni and Bagamoyo roads will ease up traffic congestion in that section of Dar-es-Salaam at rush hours. The old bridge will not be demolished but reserved for cyclists and pedestrians. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 15 Aug 80 p 2039] 5157

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ZAIRE

BRIEFS

COFFEE EXPORT BY AIR--The Bank of Zaire has sent the Zairian Banking Association the following additional communication concerning the cost of air freight from Goma to Mombasa, coming after a previous letter dated 7 June 1980 (see MARCHES TROPICAUX of 18 July, p 1806), authorizing the air transport of coffee from the eastern part of the country from Goma to Mombasa: "Following action taken by aviation companies approved for the shipping of coffee from the eastern region of the country to Mombasa and after an examination of the objective elements presented, we hereby inform you that we are increasing the cost of air freight to 23 Belgian francs per kilogram, which sum is to be deducted from the unit value to be repatriated and paid to the resident or nonresident account in foreign money opened in the name of the carrier." [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 15 Aug 80 p 2037] 11,464

CANADIAN AID FOR FOOD--For 1980, the Canadian program to supply aid in the form of food and basic products to Zaire involves a sum of nearly 9 million Canadian dollars. It includes the delivery of canned sardines, dried fish and pharmaceutical or veterinary products, as well as paper, steel and chemical products. The sale of these products will make it possible to pay some 22 million zaires into the counterpart fund, to be used for the completion of several development projects. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 15 Aug 80 p 2037] 11,464

AID FOR ROADS--The Zairian State Commission for Public Works and Territorial Development has announced that the Federal Republic of Germany has agreed to provide complete financing for a Road Office crew to repair sections of the Uvira-Kamanyola, Bukavu-Hombo and Bukavu-Goma roads in the Kivu region. For its part, the World Bank has announced that it will join with the EEC in financing work to repair the asphalted Boma-Tshela and Lubumbashi-Kipushi roads and in financing the purchase of equipment for Road Office crews. An agreement has also been signed with the Saudi Fund in the same field. The Zairian Executive Council and Japan also recently signed an agreement concerning the delivery by Japan of heavy road building equipment costing \$3.3 million. The equipment, which will go to the Shaba Road Office crew, should begin to arrive at the beginning of September. In addition, Japan will provide the Republic of Zaire with food aid amounting to \$2 million. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 15 Aug 80 p 2037] 11,464

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ZAMBIA

ZAMBIAN PRESIDENT DISCUSSES THE FUTURE OF SOUTH AFRICA

LD021235 London THE OBSERVER in English 31 Aug 80 p 12

[Article by Kenneth Kaunda, President of Zambia: "South Africa: My Last-Hour Plea to Britain"]

[Text] Now that Rhodesia is no more, there remains the most entrenched and powerful enemy of human rights in Southern Africa--the Republic of South Africa. The crucial question is: What lessons has Britain learned from the Zimbabwe conflict?

Does Britain still believe that its long-term economic interests are best served by backing the whites against the blacks in South Africa? Does the foreign office share Pretoria's view that the great flood tides of human liberation and advancement now sweeping across the world and down the African continent can be held back at the Limpopo indefinitely?

Of course Britain does not believe such things: Then why does it continue to behave as though it did?

I know I shall be told that South Africa is a very different proposition from the old Rhodesia. Of course it is militarily more powerful. Of course it has immense economic strength.

Surely, however, the lesson of the freedom struggle in Zimbabwe is now plain to our black brothers and sisters in South Africa? Once captive peoples awake and become conscious that freedom is possible, that they are not a strange species denied what the rest of humankind enjoys, then the oppressor's days are numbered. And he is powerless, in the last resort, to prevent the inevitable, because he is trying to fight not an army but an idea, and short of exterminating a whole population, he cannot bomb or blast it out of their minds.

South Africa's powerful military machine cannot save it because the crucial engagements will not be fought on any battlefield. The minority regime will start to lose the war when ordinary white citizens are no longer able to enjoy their stay in paradise because they have lost their sense of security.

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How did the whites in Rhodesia end up? Their homes were like armed fortresses and they could not go about their daily business without weapons at their hip. It was hazardous to walk down a city street and almost suicidal to drive in the country. It dawned on them they were at war, not with a handful of guerrillas but a whole people.

Their national health, instead of providing a better life for all, was increasingly eaten up by the war machine, and the lives of their young people were disrupted by conscription in order to fight a war they could not win even if it lasted for a thousand years.

I dread the prospect of a similar fate overtaking the whites in South Africa, though I fear that much of the apparatus of a police state at war is already in place. Far from banging some militarist drum and preaching the inevitability of violence, I continue to pray and work for any reconciliation with South Africa on the basis of justice for all its people. I have taken considerable political and personal risks to try to keep some dialogue going with South Africa. The chances of persuading the minority regime to change its policies have always been poor, but still worth persevering with until the very end.

It seemed to me then, and it still does, that it is worth being misunderstood or even thought a fool if it is possible to avert all-out war at the southern tip of the continent. I know that some of my colleagues have been unhappy about these dealings with the 'devil,' and there are freedom fighters, too, who think I have been sitting down and parleying with their great enemy.

I understand their feelings--South Africa has so much to answer for at the bar of history. Apartheid is such a stinging slap in the face, not only of black Africans but of all humanity, that it is hard to be polite, let alone talk seriously, to those who practice it. But it must be done. Almost any price is worth paying to avoid the risk of Africa's ultimate war.

Almost any price--except one. We will never, never rest until Africa is wiped clean of the foul stain of apartheid. We cannot live with it, or come to any accommodation with those who impose it on the black masses of South Africa. On a number of occasions, from the 1969 summit conference of East and Central African states onwards, we leaders of black Africa have tried to reassure the South African Government of our peaceful intentions; so we have never demanded majority rule in South Africa tomorrow. But we do insist that there should be universal human rights in South Africa today.

It is vital that Britain and the West take full account of the depth of our feelings about apartheid. No amount of playing around with integrated sport and other virtual irrelevancies can hide the unspeakable reality of a system that robs a whole people of their humanity, as the Nazis did to the Jews.

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Lest I be accused of selective indignation about South Africa, let me make it clear that Zambia, though a loyal member of the Organisation of African Unity, has protested again and again that the OAU's silence on the tyrannical behaviour of some black states contrasts starkly with the stridency of its attacks on South Africa.

Our public condemnation of black dictators such as Amin, Bokassa and Nguema was not popular in some quarters. We were accused of breaking ranks and giving comfort to the white minority regimes in Africa. Quite the contrary: We have earned the moral right to speak about South Africa because we have attacked tyranny wherever we have come across it on the African continent.

What is at stake in South Africa, and also Namibia, is simply man's right to be human--and that cannot be negotiable in return for supplies of uranium and precious metals, favourable terms of trade or even the chance to play against an excellent rugby team. Apartheid's challenge to all humanity is so absolute that if there is no other way we must face up, as the free world has once before in this century, to a long-hard struggle which cannot exclude the use of force.

Pray God we may all be preserved from such an awful fate. Only South Africa itself has the power to avert what is rapidly becoming inevitable by demolishing the whole vicious apparatus of apartheid, setting all its peoples free from captivity to the past and offering its immense talents and energy in the service of the development of the whole continent. I am not optimistic, but I have much faith in the providence of God. That alone seems to stand between us and the void.

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ZIMBABWE

ECONOMIC GROWTH ANTICIPATED BY BANK

Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 22 Aug 80 p 2095

[Text] In the June issue of its economic bulletin, the Standard Bank of Zimbabwe presented an in-depth analysis of the nation's economic situation shortly after independence. This analysis persuaded its research office to feel that the PIB (Gross Domestic Output) would rise less than 4 percent in 1980 in real terms and might even be between 6 and 7 percent, according to the year-end agricultural balance sheet. This would be the first time since 1974 that the growth of the PIB would exceed that of the population.

According to the bank, this growth will be based on exports. The latter came to 700 million Zimbabwe dollars (Z \$ 1 = about F 6.45) in 1979. This year it should come to at least Z \$ 930 million. This growth should come to the extent of 40 percent from the mining sector whose exported products could come to Z \$ 400 million. On the other hand, better results are expected for tobacco when compared to 1979 since the harvest during the last fiscal year, amounting to 110,000 tons, could not be sold completely and had to be gotten rid of at particularly low prices.

In spite of the increase in exports, the balance of payments should deteriorate even further; the deficit would probably increase from Z \$ 92 million in 1979 to Z \$ 200 million in 1980. Imports as a matter of fact should go up 50 percent this year as compared to their 1979 value of Z \$ 585 million and the deficit of invisible items (Z \$ 205 million in 1979) should go up to Z \$ 250 million.

The terms of exchange would seem to be improving for the first time since 1972 as a result of the lifting of sanctions.

The principal economic stimuli will not come from an influx of capital, which is expected but whose effects will not make themselves felt before 1981; instead, it is supposed to come from an increase in foreign trade as well as the supported [sustained] level of domestic purchasing power.

The industrial manufacturing sector (24.8 percent of the 1979 PIB) should further increase its share out of the national wealth and the mining

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sector should take up more than 8 percent of the 1980 PIB as against 7.8 percent for the preceding fiscal year. The hotel industry and construction industry sectors should likewise get started up again.

On the other hand, agriculture--which suffered particularly from the drought--should for the second consecutive year not be able to report any good results. Cotton output is not increasing in terms of volume. Beef output will decline (the nation's cattle population has shrunk) and the wheat harvest will also drop. Only soybean production will probably double (81,000 tons in 1979).

In 1979, agricultural output came to 8.4 percent by volume. In terms of value as such it only slightly exceeded the figure for the year before that (Z \$ 523 million, including 80 millions for traditional black agriculture, as against Z \$ 515 million in 1978), in spite of a major increase in producer purchasing prices. Corn output dropped from 877,000 tons in 1978 to 511,000 tons in 1979 and cotton output leveled off at 165,000 tons. For 1980, we expect hardly more than 600,000 tons of corn. Beef cattle slaughter for butcher shops in 1980 will probably involve only 500,000 head of cattle, as against 650,000 in 1978; it will take several years to restore the nation's herds.

Household and private sector expenditures will probably go up a total of 20 percent in 1980, whereas government expenditures will grow substantially because of the development programs following the end of hostilities. Nevertheless, the balance of payments situation will necessitate the continuation of import controls. Priority will be given to capital goods whereas the development of industry and mining will be hampered by growing problems arising from worn equipment and the shortage of skilled personnel. On the other hand, the petroleum product import costs continue to be very heavy before local energy sources can be developed in larger quantities than today.

Inflation exceeded 10 percent in 1979 but after reaching a peak in October (up 13.7 percent on an annual average for prosperous urban households), it slowed down before probably resuming again at the end of 1980 following recent wage hikes.

Inflation, on an annual average, however could turn out to be less in 1980 than what it was during the preceding fiscal year, when it was 12.5 percent.

The labor force should increase by 50,000 persons in 1980, for the first time in 5 years. The economic priority for the eighties, the Standard Bank underscored, should be aimed at the creation of jobs for the many young people who leave school as well as unemployed persons. It will be necessary to create rural development zones in order to prevent increasing unemployment in urban areas.

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White emigration will most likely increase by the end of the year. In 1979, there was a net loss of 9,304 residents, as against 11,817 in 1978. In 1980, about 10,000 whites will emigrate and the white population of Zimbabwe is destined to diminish in long-range terms.

The government is revising the 5-year development plan prepared by the Muzorewa administration, calling for Z \$ 3.5 billion in investments (or more than Z \$ 5 billion at current cost figures). The bank estimates that projects, such as the electrification of the railroads, a hydroelectric program on the Zambeze, rural development, efforts to improve the transportation system, public health, and education will at any rate be continued, not to mention the construction of the Wankie thermal power plant. It thus expects a very heavy increase in the foreign debt.

Finally, the PIB should rise from 15 to 20 percent, at market prices, in 1980. With 10-12 percent inflation, there would be real progress within the limits mentioned earlier.

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